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I' Abstract 
The modern batch chemical processing plants have a tendency of increasing 
technological complexity and flexibility which make it difficult to control the 
occurrence of accidents. Social and legal pressures have increased the demands 
for verifying the safety of chemical plants during their design and operation. 
Complete identification and accurate assessment of the hazard potential in the 
early design stages is therefore very important so that preventative or protective 
measures can be integrated into future design without adversely affecting 
processing and control complexity or capital and operational costs. Hazard and 
Operability Study (Hazop) is a method of systematically identifying every 
conceivable process deviation, its abnormal causes and adverse hazardous 
consequences in the chemical plants. However, this technique when applied to 
an entire new design is very time consuming, and often cannot be attempted 
until relatively late in the design of the plant. This problem is exacerbated in the 
case of a batch processing plant, which relies more on procedures to be followed 
by the operators. Each step of the operation will result in changes in the plant 
which is different from steady-state operation of continuous plants. It is, 
therefore, beneficial to use computer tools to reduce the amount of effort and 
time spent on Hazop analysis of batch chemical plants. 
This thesis proposes using a: state-based approach for automating batch Hazop. 
Given a batch plant and an operating procedure, the aim is to infer the state 
changes in the plant units after each step of the procedure so that the combined 
effects of the complete system behaviour canbesin1Ulated and described. Based 
on the state-based simulatiqn approach, any undesirab~e consequences due to 
. . 
operating ·errors can be identifi'ed and reported. 'A novel framework for 
describing actions and modelling their effects, together with a simulation 
algorithm is described. A prototype system, called CHECKOP, is designed and 
implemented based on the proposed framework. Three examples are used to test 
the approach and the results are described. 
Keywords: Computer-aided HAZOP, Batch Plants, Safety Engineering 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The safety of chemical processing plants is vital to their successful operation. 
Quality design technology relies on the ability to identify and eliminate inherent 
design weaknesses in advance of operations. Identification and assessment of 
the hazard potential in the early design stages is particularly important, so that 
preventative or protective measures can be integrated into the design without 
adversely affecting processing and control complexity or capital and operational 
costs. 
The modem batch chemical processing plants have a tendency of increasing 
technological complexity and flexibility which complicates hazard evaluation. 
Since changes often occur in the plant, the need to identify hazards as early as 
possible in the development stages does not imply that hazard identification 
ends when the design specifications have been approved. Approval of a design 
in fact means only: "at the time of the study the study team believes that, 
provided the plant is constructed and operated in accordance with their 
recommendations, the plant will be acceptably safe" [Lowe and Solomon, 1983]. 
The first uncontrolled change during construction, or the first unapproved 
modification during operation, negates this approval. Consequently, hazard 
identification is a continuing ingredient of safe operations and should be applied, 
sometimes in a very simple form, to control any changes from the original 
intentions of the designers. 
There are a number of hazard identification and hazard analysis methods used to 
systematize hazard identification, which can be either qualitative or quantitative 
in nature [Lees, 1996]. Qualitative methods can be seen as methods which deal 
with events at an abstract level, while quantitative methods are supporting 
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methods to deal with detailed analysis and evaluation of specific identified 
problems [Mushtaq and Chung, 2000]. 
One approach, the Hazard and Operability Study (Hazop), is a method 
developed by ICI in the 1960s for identifying hazards in chemical plant design. 
The method facilitates the systematic exploration of every conceivable process 
deviation, its abnormal causes and adverse hazardous consequences in a 
chemical plant [Kletz, 1999]. 
Hazop has been a key tool in carrying out safety analysis in the process 
industries. Compared to other methods, Hazop has proved to be the most 
powerful and effective method available for identifying hazards. It provides a 
systematic methodology which facilitates the extensive identification of 
potential hazard scenarios. On the other hand, doing Hazop needs a group of 
experts and it usually takes quite a long time to do. These will raise the cost. 
Furthermore, since Hazop is a technique for identifying the hazards of a whole 
system, it requires a great deal of effort from the team. It depends on the 
experience of the experts. Inexperienced engineers can easily miss potential 
problems which should have been followed-up. 
In the light of the advantages and disadvantages, it is the aim of this project to 
develop a system which is able to handle this labour intensive job quickly, 
efficiently and effectively. 
There are researchers working in automated Hazop [Larkin, Rushton et aI., 1997; 
Leone, 1996; Venkatasubramanian and Vaidhyanathan, 1994; Wakeman, Chung 
et aI., 1997; McCoy, Wakeman et aI., 1999 & 2000]. But these works are 
limited to consideration of continuously operating plants. Limitations can also 
be f?und in other published work on computer aided risk assessment [Catino, 
Grantham et aI., 1991; Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian, 1995; Chae 
and Yoon, 1994; Shimada, Suzuki et aI., 1996]. 
A small number of researchers have looked at the problem of modelling batch 
plant behaviour for risk assessment [Mau, Nolan et aI., 1996; Shimada, Yang, et 
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aI., 1995; Nam, Jeong et aI., 1996; Srinivasan and Venkatasubramanian, 1996]. 
However, these approaches were usually developed for specific plants only. A 
more generic system that could deal with different batch plants is required. 
1.2 Objectives and Contributions 
As stated in the project proposal, the overall aims of this project are: 
• To enhance the current state of the art in qualitative modelling of 
process systems, to include batch plants. 
• To test a state-based approach to physical systems modelling on a 
particular real-world problem, with a view to later deployment of similar 
approaches in other fields of application. 
• To examine how different types of information can be integrated within 
a model to allow reliable prediction of the behaviour of a system. 
• To improve the understanding of how hazardous scenarios develop in 
batch processing plants, in order to help reduce the future incidence of 
life-threatening accidents in such plants. 
The specific activities necessary to achieve these aims are: 
• Conduct an analysis of the types of knowledge required to capture the 
operation of batch plants using model-based reasoning techniques. 
• Produce a definite system formalism for modelling the state-dependent 
behaviour of process plants through time. 
• Investigate the definition and use of new models, expressed in the 
specified formalism, by means of software tools for user modelling of 
batch plant systems. 
• Create a software tool for animating the models produced, allowing the 
user to control the process of plant simulation by means of an 
appropriate interface. 
• Examine the requirements for systematic risk assessment in batch plants, 
and consider how these can be addressed by software in general and 
model-based systems in particular. 
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• Build a proof of concept software application to demonstrate one or 
more risk assessment techniques on a batch processing plant case study. 
The implementation of this above proposed framework constitutes a major 
advance in the identification of hazards. Successful demonstration of this 
methodology will result in the following contributions: 
• Formal systematisation of hazard analysis; 
• Automation of hazard analysis and the detection of hazardous 
scenarios; 
• Development of an expressive modelling language for chemical 
batch process representation and generation; 
• Generation of an expressive and process generic software package; 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the conventional hazard identification and 
analysis methods. This forms the background on the range of tools that 
engineers can apply to identify potential hazards in the process industries. 
Chapter 3 focuses on HAZOP analysis of batch processes and explains why it is 
difficult to automate. Chapter 4 reviews the technologies and applications 
related to hazard identification of batch processes and points out what weakness 
they have in modelling batch processes. Chapter 5 proposes a novel approach to 
represent batch processes and illustrates the overall system architect of 
CHECKOP for modelling and simulating batch processing plants in qualitative 
terms. Chapter 6 uses three typical examples chosen to illustrate the HAZOP 
capability of CHECKOP and to identify the limitations of the current prototype. 
Chapter 7 concludes the current work and address the future work based on the 
limitations identified in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2 
Overview of Hazard Identification 
Methods 
2.1 Hazard Identification 
Hazard analysis is defined as the systematic investigation of inherent, acute 
hazards of a process, under normal operating conditions as well as under 
reasonably foreseeable abnormal conditions [Lawley, 1974]. In an analysis the 
inherent hazards, the properties of all chemicals involved, as well as the 
characteristics of the process must be studied. The objective of the analysis is to 
determine the safe limits of the process parameters and to appreciate the effects 
when the process parameters move outside these limits. 
The overall goal of a typical hazard analysis of a chemical process is to develop 
operating and design criteria intended to prevent or lessen the effects of 
identified hazards. In order to accomplish this goal, the analysis must begin by 
identifying critical material characteristics, operating conditions and faults that 
would cause a processing plant to deviate from its normal operating condition 
into a hazardous situation. 
Individual experience, broadened by information from the experience of others, 
is the fundamental requirement for hazard identification. National and 
international codes and standards are examples of how this expertise is captured. 
The authors of a code are implying that ''based on their collective experience, 
equipment designed to their code will be acceptably safe" [Brannegan, 1985]. 
Consequently, codes and practices provide minimum standards against which 
deviations from safe practices can be identified and appraised. Systematic 
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comparison of a design specification with recognised codes and practices forms 
the basis of one farnily of hazard identification methods which can be described 
as comparative methods. An important advantage of these methods is that the 
lessons learned through many years of experience are incorporated in the 
company's practices and thus are available to be used at all stages in the design 
and construction of the plant. The main task of the hazard identification study is 
to ensure that the company's practices, and therefore lessons learnt from its past 
experience, have indeed been incorporated in the design. 
In the case of new processes, which are outside the scope of existing codes of 
practice, prior experience may not be easily available. Consequently, the hazard 
identification methods used in such cases have to be directed to stimulating the 
tearn members to utilize their own experience of safe and unsafe process 
conditions as the standard against which to evaluate the design. These methods 
are essentially structured ways for stimulating a group of people to apply their 
knowledge to the task of identifying hazards mainly by asking a series of 
questions. 
Various procedures and techniques have been developed to aid identification of 
hazards throughout the different stages of new projects as well as in existing 
operating units. These techniques include [Lees, 1996]: 
• Checklists 
• Safety review 
• Hazard Indices 
• Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
• Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) 
• "What if' analysis 
• Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
• Fault Trees 
• Cause-Consequence Analysis 
• Event Trees 
• Human error analysis 
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The next section gives an overview of the conventional hazard identification 
methods used in the process industries. This forms the background about what 
methods are used to identify the potential hazards and how they are applied in 
the process industries. Section 2.3 focuses on one particular hazard 
identification method, namely Hazard and Operability Studies, which provides 
the necessary background for the next chapter and the rest of the thesis. 
2.2 Hazard Identification Methods 
2.2.1 Checklists 
Checklists manifest themselves as experience-based questionnaires and, as such, 
are limited to the experience base of the authors. They are engineered to 
demonstrate design compliance with standard procedures and provide direction 
for standard evaluation of chemical plant hazards. Checklists can be as detailed 
as necessary to satisfy the specific situation, but should be applied 
conscientiously in order to identify problems that require attention and to ensure 
that standard procedures are being followed. 
A checklist is easy to use and can be applied to each stage of a project or plant 
development. A checklist is a convenient means of communicating the minimal 
acceptable level of hazard evaluation that is required for any job, regardless of 
scope. 
2.2.2 Safety Reviews 
Safety reviews can vary from an informal walk through on-site inspection that is 
principally visual, with emphasis on housekeeping, to a formal week-long 
examination by a team with appropriate backgrounds and responsibilities. Such 
a program is intended to identify plant conditions or operating procedures that 
could lead to an accident and significant losses in life or property. Safety review 
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allows engineers to minimize the potential hazards due to both equipment and 
operating procedures by assuring that all of their elements are in place and 
functional or corrective action is taken when the inspection results fall outside 
of acceptable limits. 
2.2.3 Hazard Indices 
Hazard indices such as that developed by Dow Chemical Company [Fire and 
Explosion Index, 1976] and extended by Lewis [Lewis, 1979], are methods 
which are designed to give a quantitative indication of the potential for 
hazardous incidents associated with a given plant design. The methods assign 
penalties and credits based on plant features. Penalties are assigned to process 
materials and conditions that can contribute to an accident. Credits are assigned 
to plant safety features that can mitigate the effects of an accident. These 
penalties and credits are combined to derive an index that is a relative ranking of 
the plant risk. Estimates of consequences in terms of cost and outage time can 
also be included in the evaluations. These methods are particularly useful in the 
early stages of hazard assessment in that they require a minimum of process and 
design data and can graphically demonstrate which areas within the plant 
require more detailed attention. They can also help to identify which of several 
competing process routes will contain the least inherent hazards. 
The primary difference between the Dow Index and the Mond Index is that the 
latter specifically addresses material toxicity in addition to flammability and 
reactivity in assigning material factors to a process unit. The Dow Index may 
actually be easier to use because of the extensive use of tables and graphs in 
place of traditional equations, but both use the same basic calculation method. 
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2.2.4 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
The main purpose of this analysis is to recognize hazards early. This is achieved 
by speculating about possible causes, consequences, and corrective measures 
early in the design process. It is generally applied during the concept or early 
development phase of a process plant and can be very useful in site selection. 
PHA is a precursor to further hazard analyses. The identified hazards can then 
be categorised whether they are accepted or needing further investigation. When 
safety is an issue, such hazard will be tracked in a hazard log subject to further 
review. This information will be used to reduce the severity or build-in 
safeguards against the effects of the identified hazards. 
2.2.5 "What If' 
The purpose of a "What If' analysis is to consider carefully the result of 
unexpected events that would produce an adverse consequence [Lees, 1996]. 
The method involves examination of possible deviations from the design, 
construction, modification, or operating intent of the plant. The questions are 
divided into specific areas of investigation (usually related to consequences of 
concern), such as electrical safety, fue protection, or personnel safety. It 
requires a basic understanding of what is intended and the ability to mentally 
combine or synthesize possible deviations from design intent that would cause 
an undesired result. The "What if' method enables the team to identify the 
potential impact of a variety of initiative events upon the original design intent. 
These forecasted changes will then help the team to target and prioritize the 
scenarios with the greatest expected benefits. 
2.2.6 Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
The result of a FMECA is a tabulation of the system/plant equipment, their 
failure modes, each failure mode's effect on the system/plant, and a criticality 
ranking for each failure mode. The related "Failure Modes and Effects 
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Analysis" (FMEA) is equivalent to FMECA without a criticality ranking. The 
failure mode is a description of how equipment fails (open, closed, on, off, 
leaks, etc.). The effects of the failure mode are ~e system responses or potential 
accidents resulting from the equipment failure. FMECA identifies single failure 
modes that either directly result in, or contribute significantly to, an important 
accident. Human/operator errors are generally not examined by an FMECA; 
however, the effects of maloperation are usually described by an equipment 
failure mode. FMECA is not efficient for identifying combinations of 
equipment failures that lead to accidents. 
The method is especially useful for the analysis of very critical processes but is 
extremely time consuming if applied on too broad a scale. The FMECA can be 
performed by as few as two analysts or by a multidisciplinary team of 
professionals. 
2.2.7 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis is a deductive technique that focuses on one particular event 
and provides a method for determining causes of that accident event [Lees, 
1996]. The fault tree itself is a graphical model that displays the various 
combinations of equipment faults and failures that can result in the accident 
event. The solution of the fault tree is a list ofthe sets of equipment failures that 
are sufficient to result in the accident event of interest. These sets of failures are 
known as "cut sets", and the smallest sets of failures sufficient to cause the top 
event are known as the "minimal cut sets" of the fault tree. FT A can include 
contributing human/operator errors as well as equipment failures. 
Ranking the minimal cut sets is the final step of the fault tree analysis 
procedure. Structural importance is reflected by the number of basic events that 
are in each minimal cut set. In this type of ranking, a one event minimal cut set 
is more important than a two event minimal cut set; a two event set is more 
important than a three event set; and so on. This ranking implies that one event 
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is more likely to occur than two events, two events are more likely to occur than 
three events, etc. 
The strength of FTA as a qualitative tool is its ability to break down an accident 
into basic equipment failures and human errors. This allows the safety analyst to 
focus preventive measures on these basic causes to reduce the probability of an 
accident. 
Both failure modes and effects analysis and fault tree analysis are useful aids to 
hazard identification as they both structure and document the analysis. 
However, because they involve very detailed analysis of components and 
operations, their use in the process industry is mainly limited to identification of 
special hazards where they form the basis of quantification of risks. 
2.2.8 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
Event trees are modified form of the decision trees traditionally used in business 
applications. Event trees provide a precise way of recording the accident 
sequences and defining the relationships between the initiating events and the 
subsequent events that combine to result in an accident. Then by ranking the 
accidents, or through a subsequent quantitative evaluation, the most important 
accidents are identified. Event trees are well suited for analysing initiating 
events that could result in a variety of effects. An event tree emphasizes the 
initial cause and works from the initiating event to the final effects of the event. 
Each branch of the event tree represents a separate effect (event sequence) that 
is a clearly defined set of functional relationships. 
Event tree analysis is a technique for evaluating potential accident outcomes 
reSUlting from a specific system failure or human error known as an initiating 
event. Event tree analysis considers operator response or safety system response 
to the initiating event in determining the potential accident outcomes. The 
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results of the event tree analysis are accident sequences; that is, a chronological 
set of failures or errors that define an accident. These results describe the 
possible accident outcomes in terms of the sequence of events (successes or 
failures of safety functions) that follow an initiating event. Event tree analysis is 
well suited for systems that have safety systems or emergency procedures in 
place to respond to specific initiating events. 
2.2.9 Cause-consequence analysis (CCA) 
Cause-consequence analysis combines the forward thinking features of event 
tree analysis with the reverse thinking features of fault tree analysis. The result 
is a technique that relates specific accident consequences to their many possible 
basic causes. 
The solution of the cause-consequence diagram for a particular accident 
sequence is a list of accident sequence minimal cut sets. These sets are 
analogous to fault tree minimal cut sets because they represent all the 
combinations of basic causes that can result. in the accident. A quantitative 
analysis using these sets can provide estimates of the frequency of occurrence of 
each accident event sequence. 
A major strength of cause-consequence analysis is its use as a communication 
tool: the cause-consequence diagram displays the interrelationships between the 
accident outcomes (consequences) and their basic causes. The method can also 
be used to quantify the expected frequency of occurrence of the consequences if 
the appropriate data are available. 
2.2.10 Human Error Analysis (HEA) 
Human beings are key components of industrial processes. They are involved in 
each step of process design, operation, maintenance, etc. Human error analysis 
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is a systematic evaluation of the factors that influence the performance of 
human operators, maintenance staff, technicians, and other plant personnel in 
the plant. Behavioural and/or causal guide words are systematically applied to 
what human people do, usually a task or a scenario so that situations where the 
problems lie could be found. Behavioural guide words take a so called 
phenotypical perspective as a starting point, which might be an action omission, 
actions in a wrong order, time error (too early, too late) and qualitative error 
(too much, too little). Its primary purpose is to identify potential human errors 
and their effects, or identify the cause of observed human errors. 
2.3 Hazard and Operability Studies (Hazop) 
Hazop is a technique which was first developed by IeI in the 1960's, for 
examining process designs for hazards and operability problems. Since then it 
has been widely adopted in the chemical process industries and adapted for use 
in many other domains. The essence of the traditional Hazop study is to 
examine the detailed process design, as expressed in the piping and 
instrumentation drawings (P&IDs) of a new plant. 
Firstly, a Hazop team (usually comprised of around 6 people) is assembled. The 
members of the team should include process engineers involved in the design of 
the plant, operational staff concerned with day-to-day operations, mechanical 
and control engineers with an interest in the project. A team leader must be 
appointed, who has no formal connection with the project, but has the sole duty 
of managing the Hazop study meetings. A scribe may also join the team, in 
order to record the actions arising from the study. 
Meetings should then be scheduled when all team members are able to attend -
the duration should not be too long (max. 2 or 3 hours) and the meetings should 
not be scheduled too closely together, as they are quite intensive for the team 
members. The P &IDs should be allocated to meetings in the series, so that the 
whole process is covered in a fairly logical sequence and the most important 
areas of the process are examined early on in the sequence. The team leader 
13 
should allocate these according to experience of time needed for Hazops, and 
under guidance of the project team, who know the process design. 
In the Hazop meetings, the team identify a number of sections of a P&ID, called 
"nodes", to be examined in sequence. Each node should cover a process line or 
well-defmed process equipment item. 
In examining each study node, the team firstly agree on the process design 
intention of the node. Then, they identify all the possible ways that the plant 
could fail to achieve this design intention, using a method for generating 
deviations and assessing whether the deviations are possible or not. 
Each deviation is composed of a process parameter (taken from Figure 2.1) and 
a guide word (taken from Figure 2.2). [Tables adapted from: IChemE Safety 
Training Package 034, "Hazop and multi stage hazard study", 1999]. All 
sensible combinations of process parameter and guide word are examined for 
each study node. For each deviation, the team consider whether there are any 
possible causes of the deviation and whether there are any hazardous 
consequences or operability problems arising from the deviation itself or from 
the identified causes of that deviation. 
Flow 
Pressure 
Temperature 
Mixing 
Stirring 
Level 
Viscosity 
etc ... 
Figure 2.1 Example process parameters for use in Hazop Studies 
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Guide Word Meaning 
None None of the design intent is achieved 
More of Quantitative increase in a parameter 
Less of Quantitative decrease in a parameter 
More than (As well as) An additional activity occurs 
Part of Only some of the design intent is achieved 
Reverse Logical opposite of the design intention occurs 
Other than Complete substitution. Another activity takes place 
Before I After The step (or some part of it) is effected out of sequence 
Early ILate The timing is different from the intention 
Figure 2.2 Example Hazop Guide Words and their Meanings 
Any significant problems are recorded in a tabular format, giving the deviation, 
causes and consequences. The team also record any instrument systems 
intended to protect against the problem, as well as any suggested actions arising 
from the discussion. The purpose of the Hazop meeting is NOT to solve the 
problem identified - that will normally be taken care of outside of the meeting. 
After the Hazop meetings, the actions are dealt with by the various engineering 
departments (process, mechanical, etc.), and should be sorted out before design 
is approved for construction. 
Hazop is known to be the best technique for hazard identification, as it is 
systematic, complete and rigorous in looking at all combinations of events 
which could present problems. However, the method does have a high cost in 
terms of the quantity of expert time needed to conduct the meetings, which 
makes them difficult to schedule. Hazop meetings also impose a significant 
strain on participants and, because they are usually conducted after the detailed 
process design of a plant, can delay the completion of a project. For this reason, 
there is much interest in methods which can reduce the burden of Hazops, in 
order to free up engineers' time for other tasks. 
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2.4 Summary 
This chapter has given an overview of the different methods that are available 
for hazard identification and analysis. Hazard indices is a good tool in the early 
stages of hazard assessment of the plant with minimum process and design data. 
Checklist is easy to use and can be applied to each stage of a project but it is 
experience-based questionnaires. Preliminary hazard analysis categorise the 
identified hazards. It is generally applied at the concept or early development 
stage of a process plant. "What if' analysis examines the adverse impact of 
unexpected events upon the original intent. FMECA is useful for the critical 
process analysis but could be very time consuming for a fairly large scaled 
system. Fault tree analysis is a deductive and qualitative technique which breaks 
down an accident into basic equipment failures and human errors. It is limited to 
identifY special hazards based on quantified risks. ETA evaluates potential 
accident outcomes resulting due to an initiating event such as system failure or 
human error. This technique is suitable for those systems with safety systems or 
emergency procedures. CCA combines features of event tree analysis and fault 
tree analysis by relating consequences to their possible causes. REA is used to 
identifY the impact of the performance of human operators. Particular attention 
has given to the description of HAZOP as it is one the most widely used and 
respected hazard identification techniques used in the chemical process industry. 
HAZOP is very similar to engineer's analysis on the real process plant. In 
Hazop, each node of P&ID is studied and identified all the possible ways that 
the plant could fail to achieve design intention by generating deviations with 
guide words and assessing whether these imagined deviations are possible or 
not. The causes and consequences of these deviations are recorded for further 
preventive actions. 
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Chapter 3 
HAZOP of Batch Processing Plants 
3.1 HAZOP of Batch Processes 
The issues in RAZOP analysis for batch processes are significantly different 
from those for continuous plants. In a batch process, operations are performed 
in a sequence of "operating instructions". Rather than the plant remaining at a 
"steady state", the process variables associated with operations could change 
during the execution of an individual instruction. Therefore, the methods 
applied to Razop continuous processes are not sufficient to Razop analysis for 
batch process. Recently, Mushtaq and Chung [2000] proposed a systematic 
Razop procedure for batch processes and an application of this method to 
pipeless plants. New guidewords are introduced for Razop of batch processes in 
addition to the basic set used in continuous processes. Table 3.1 below lists 
these guidewords for batch Razop: 
Batch Razop Guidewords 
Reverse 
Early 
Late 
Before 
After 
Quickly 
Slowly 
Table 3.1 Additi~nal Guidewords for Batch Razop 
In addition to applying guidewords to the process variables in the batch process, 
which is similar to the method used in continuous processes, Razop analysis of 
17 
a batch process also takes into account the 'deviations' from operating 
instructions, some of which are: 
• Keywords Before and After - used for situations where something 
happens before or after it is expected in terms of sequence; 
• Keywords Early and Later - used for situations where something 
happens earlier or later than expected relative to clock time; 
• Keywords Quickly and Slowly - used for situations where something 
happens quicker or slower than expected; 
• Keyword Reverse - used for situations where something opposite the 
original intention is achieved. 
3.2 Coffee Making Example 
In this section a Hazop analysis of a batch process - making a cup of coffee - is 
carried out manually by applying guidewords as discussed above in order to 
show the kind of output expected of an automated batch Hazop system. 
3.2.1 Information Needed 
To do a batch Hazop on making a cup of coffee, the following information is 
needed: 
• A procedure of making a cup of coffee to be analysed. 
• Guidewords such as More, Less, Early, Quickly to be applied to the 
process or process variables. 
• Standard set of process variables such as Flow, Temperature, and Level, 
to which guidewords are applied. 
• A set of Instruction words such as Mix, React, and Heat, to which 
guidewords are also applied. 
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3.2.2 Hazop Analysis 
Firstly, a set of instructions to be analysed is prepared: 
1. Fill water in an electrical kettle 
2. Plug the socket into the main 
3. Turn on the switch on the kettle (the red light is on showing it is 
connected) 
4. Wait for water in the kettle to boil, while filling in a cup with some 
instant coffee with a spoon 
5. Pour boiled water into the cup 
6. Add milk into the cup 
7. Add sugar into the cup with a spoon 
8. Stir immediately with a spoon until sugar is dissolved. 
Then perform a batch Hazop by applying guide words to the above procedure as 
well as process variables in each step. 
Step Guide Deviation Possible Causes Consequences/Output 
Words 
I NO No water in the l.No water supply No coffee 
kettle 2.Tap fails open 
1 MORE Too much 3. Tap is left open Spillage while 
water in kettle for too long. overflowing due to 
heating expansion. 
1 LESS Less water In 4.Operator fails to No boiled water 
kettle check the water 
level 
1 OTHE Maintenance 5.1oss of No coffee 
R containment of the 
THAN kettle 
1 Early Fill water In 6. Operator Water in the kettle 
the kettle too decided to make not fresh. 
early. coffee, but then 
changes his mind. 
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Step Guide Deviation Possible Causes Consequences/Output 
Words 
1 Late Fill water m 7.Operator forgets Resistor or fuse 
the kettle too to fill water in the burns. 
late. kettle before 
someone reminds 
him or he realised 
about it. 
1 After Fill water m 8. Operator fails to Resistor or fuse 
the kettle after follow the bums. 
the kettle instruction. 
switch IS 
turned on. 
1 Quickl Fill water m 9.The water in the Spillage while 
y the kettle too kettle overflows or overflowing due to 
- . . 
fast. spills out of kettle. heating expansion. 
1 Slowly Fill water m 10. Water is below No boiled water or 
the kettle too the required level. time consuming 
slowly. 1l. It takes too 
long prepanng 
coffee. 
2 NO No socket 12. Socket is being No coffee 
available used for some 
other purpose. 
3 NO Switch Not 13. Operator No boiled water 
turned on forgets turn on the 
switch 
14. No electrical 
supply. 
15. Socket fails to 
plug into mam 
properly. 
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Step Guide Deviation Possible Causes Consequences/Output 
Words 
3 OTHE Maintenance 16. Main power No coffee 
R socket failures 
THAN 17. Kettle socket 
failures 
18. Red light 
failures 
19. Electrical 
circuit failures 
4 NO No bottled 20. Instant coffee No coffee 
instant coffee previously used up 
4 NO No spoon 21. Spoon was lost Operator would fail 
available or used for other to control the amount 
purpose. of sugar added into 
the coffee. 
4 MORE Too much 22. Operator is not Coffee is too strong 
coffee III the experienced or has 
cup no sense about 
how much instant 
coffee should be 
put into the cup. 
4 LESS Less coffee III Covered by (22) Coffee is too weak 
the cup 
4 EARL Operator fills Covered by (22) Coffee IS solidified 
y instant coffee and tastes not well. 
in the cup too 
early. 
5 LESS Temperature 23. Water is below Coffee smells not 
boiling point. strong 
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Step Guide Deviation Possible Causes Consequences/Output 
Words 
5 MORE Pour more 24. Water Coffee is too weak 
water III the overflows 
cup 
5 BEFO Pour out water Covered by (23) Coffee smells not 
RE before it boils. strong 
5 QUICK Flow 25. Water spillage Coffee contaminated 
LY or overflow over the desk 
the cup. 
5 SLOW Temperature 26. Water Coffee tastes not well 
LY becomes cooler. 
6 NO No milk 27. Milk was used Coffee tastes not 
available up. smoothly 
6 MORE Too much milk 28. Operator is not Coffee is too weak. 
in coffee experienced or has 
no sense about 
how much milk 
should be put into 
the cup. 
6 LESS Less milk III Covered by (22) Coffee tastes not 
coffee smoothly 
6 QUICK Flow Covered by (25) Coffee contaminated 
LY the desk 
6 SLOW Temperature Covered by (26) Coffee tastes not well 
LY 
7 NO No sugar 29.Sugar was used Coffee doesn't taste 
available up sweet. 
7 NO No spoon Covered by (21) Operator would fail 
available to control the amount 
of sugar added into 
the coffee. 
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Step Guide Deviation Possible Causes Consequences/Output 
Words 
7 MORE Too much 30. Operator is not Coffee is too sweet 
sugar in coffee experienced or has 
no sense about 
how much milk 
should be put into 
the cup. 
7 LESS Less sugar III Covered by (22) Coffee is not sweet 
coffee enough. 
7 QUICK Flow Covered by (25) Sugar or coffee 
LY spillage out of cup. 
7 SLOW Temperature Covered by (26) Coffee tastes not 
LY well. 
8 LESS Operator failed 31. Distraction Coffee tastes not very 
to stir the 32. Operator is not well. 
liquid properly. experienced 
8 MORE Operator 33. Covered by Coffee tastes not well 
stirred the (26) 
liquid too long 
8 OTHE Maintenance 34. Spoon Coffee tastes not very 
R suddenly broke well 
THAN when stirring. 
8 BEFO Operator Covered by (8) Coffee tastes not very 
RE stirred before well 
step 1 or 4. 
8 AFTER Operator Covered by (8) Coffee tastes not very 
stirred after well 
drinking. 
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Step Guide Deviation Possible Causes Consequences/Output 
Words 
8 QUICK Flow Covered by (25) Sugar or coffee 
LY spillage out of cup 
8 SLOW Temperature Covered by (26) Coffee tastes not well 
LY 
Table 3.2 Batch Hazop Result for Coffee-Making Example 
In a batch process, the operator plays a key role in the individual processing 
instructions. An inadvertent operation by the plant operator could lead to direct 
or indirect hazards. The operator could perform the operations in a sequence 
different from that required by the instructions. For example, the operator could 
pour water out of the kettle before it boils in step 5. The direct consequence that 
step 5 is performed before step 4 is that the operator can't get boiled water. The 
indirect consequence for that is the operator can't get a right coffee in step 8. 
The keywords such as Before, After are used to generate such situations. 
The operator could also induce hazards by initiating or terminating a step either 
earlier or later than indicated in the instruction. For example, the operator may 
fill the instant coffee in the cup too early in step 4. The direct impact is the 
instant coffee is solidified. The indirect impact is that the coffee may taste not 
very well finally. The keywords like Early, Late are used to generate such 
incidents. 
The operator may work faster or slower than required by the instructions. ,For 
example, in step 8, he may stir the coffee in the cup faster than expected. This 
can often lead to hazards, i.e., the coffee will spill out of the cup. The keywords 
like Quickly, Slowly are used to generate such situations. 
Process variable deviations in batch process are similar to those in continuous 
process. The guide words such as No, More, Less, Part of, As well as, Other 
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Than are used to modify the process variables like Flow, Temperature, and 
Level in each individual step to generate process variable deviations. 
3.3 Issues with Automating Batch HAZOP 
In batch processes, the plant P&ID is obviously not sufficient to represent the 
plant operations, called instructions. The instructions emphasise the sequential 
nature of the batch process. An instruction can comprise of a set of processing 
steps. After the first step is completed, the second step is started and so forth till 
the last step is finished. Each step is performed in an equipment unit and causes 
the state of the equipment, or process variables within the equipment, to change. 
When the next step is started, the previous process variable or variables may 
remain or reach another particular value or values. That process variable may 
have a direct impact on the equipment unit or indirect impact on the other 
equipment units by propagation leading to hazards, or an accumulative adverse 
consequence or consequences on equipment unit(s) when performing another 
consequent step( s). 
The greatest difficulty in automating batch Hazop is in modelling batch 
processes. The methods used for modelling continuous plants, such as signed 
directed graphs (SDGs), cannot account for the discontinuities in batch 
operations. The methods used for modelling discrete events such as Petri nets 
are too complex and not flexible enough to deal with changes in the operating 
procedure. Even a simple coffee example could have 33 nodes to be analysed. 
An ideal representation should represent the instructions in a proper way so that 
none of the necessary information is lost. Depending on the representation 
chosen, an atomic step in a set of instructions could deliver information in very 
different configurations. In the coffee example, step I 'Fill water in an electrical 
kettle', contains information about where the step is performed, what action is 
performed, what object it is being performed on, and what intention is to be 
reached. However, step 4 'Wait for water in the kettle is boiled' just contains 
information about what action is performed and what intention is to be reached. 
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This makes it difficult to generate a uniform and structured format with 
reusability and scalability, suitable for implementing batch Hazop automation. 
Another difficulty is in representing the causal relationship between state 
variables. An instruction contains information about the sequence of each action 
to be performed. However, it does not contain any information about the cause 
and effect relationships between process variables. When a team of experts 
perform Hazop analysis of a plant, they use their mental models of the process 
to obtain cause and effect relationship. This causal model of each step is critical 
for conducting batch Hazop analysis. 
In batch operation, a reaction could lead to the change of the states such as the 
amount or heat content of the materials in an equipment unit. In the coffee 
example, the operator stirs the content of the cup not only making the coffee 
tastier but also makes the content more homogeneous. Modelling the 
transformation of the materials should also be included. 
The duration for which each step is performed is important for batch Hazop 
analysis. In the coffee example, if heating is performed on the water for a 
shorter time than indicated, the temperature of the contents is quite low which 
results in failure to make a cup of coffee. An action should be terminated when 
the expectation is reached. 
Equipment malfunction is process independent and occurs when there are 
deviations in the state variables. In the coffee example, when the tap fails to 
open, there is no flow path from the water tank to the kettle, so the kettle cannot 
be filled. Therefore, the propagation modeling is also important for batch Hazop 
analysis. 
26 
Chapter 4 
Related Technologies and Applications 
This chapter reviews the technologies and applications related to hazard 
identification of batch processes, which is the focus of this thesis. 
4.1 Signed-Directed Graphs 
4.1.1 Overview 
SDG model is an important technology of building qualitative model, especially 
for hazard evaluation and fault diagnosis. SDG model can be used to express the 
complex cause and effect relations, and has great potential for modelling 
process knowledge. The structure of SDG model is straightforward and easy to 
modify. 
The key technique of using SDG for qualitative simulation is the high efficiency 
two-direction inference engine, which is performed by software automatically. A 
SDG contains the process variables, for example, flow in a physical system. The 
variables are connected by arcs to reflect the influence one variable has on 
another variable. Each arc is labeled "+" or "-" to indicate what kind of 
influence it is. For example, X ~ Y indicates Y will increase/decrease if X 
is increased/decreased. X -=---. Y indicates Y will decrease/increase if X is 
increased/decreased. Up to now, SDG has been the most effective method in 
computer aided process hazard assessment. 
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4.1.2 Related Applications 
HAZOP analysis is very laborious and time consuming, so there is a significant 
motivation to automate this activity. An automated system can help to make the 
analysis more thorough and detailed, and minimize human errors as well. A lot 
of work has been done in the effort to automate the Hazop analysis for 
continuous chemical plants using SDG technology. 
A number of research projects have been carried out with the aim of developing 
automated HAZOP tools. [McCoy, 1999] gives a brief history of the work done 
at Loughborough University on automating HAZOP. Chung [Chung, 1993], on 
the other hand, developed a generic design tool for HAZOP and other 
techniques, called QUEEN (Qualitative Effects Engine) by using SDG (signed 
directed graph). The tool QUEEN was used to connect a frame-based unit 
modelling system, in which each sub-system was modelled by a SDG at a sub-
level, so as to build up the whole plant model. J efferson et al. [J efferson, Chung 
et aI., 1995] extended Chung's work to develop CHEQUER (Computer HAZOP 
Emulation using Qualitative Effects Reasoning). McCoy et al. [McCoy, 
Wakeman, et aI., 1999a; 1999b; 1999c; 2000a; 2000b] further extended the 
QUEEN and HAZOP algorithms and developed a tool known as HAZID within 
the STOPHAZ project. HAZID is now being developed into a commercial tool 
[McCoy et ai, 2004]. However, all of these previous works on automating 
HAZOP focused primarily on handling continuous plants. The basic technology 
employed are not suitable for handling batch plants. 
Another significant group doing research in this area is based at Purdue 
University. Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian [1996] developed 
"HAZOPExpert", a system based on G2 system which is a model based 
framework and a process-related expert system for automating the HAZOP 
analysis of continuous plants. A kind of SDG representation called HOG 
(Hazop Digraph) is used to add nodes representing faults and consequences 
related to process variable deviations. A semi-quantitative reasoning 
methodology is used for filtering and ranking the HAZOP results using 
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additional quantitative information in the form of design and operating 
specifications of the process units and process material property values. The 
qualitative values "high", "low", "zero" or "normal" are applied to process 
variable nodes which are connected by the directed arcs to indicate the 
qualitative causal influence between the process variables at a "positive" or 
"negative" gain level. However, they did not discuss about how they deal with 
the situations like "zero" or "normal". 
4.1.3 Discussion 
A SDG appears to be well-suited to depicting the continuous plants. However, it 
seems not to be applicable to the context of batch processing. A batch process 
has a special nature, in which the behaviour of the plant changes over time, and 
is dependent on the states of its equipment items. 
4.2 Petri nets 
4.2.1 Overview 
The Petri nets representation was first proposed by Carl Adam Petri in his 
doctoral dissertation work on communication with automata in 1962 [petri, 
1962]. Causal relationships between events in a computer system are described 
using a net. A.W.Holt [Holt, Saint et al., 1968] and others of the Information 
System Theory Project of Applied Research, Inc. in the United States illustrated 
how Petri nets could be used to model and analyse systems of many concurrent 
components. Petri's work also came to the attention of The Computation 
Structure Group at Massachussetts Institute of Technology, led by Professor 
J.B.Dermis [Dermis, 1970]. Several doctoral theses and technical reports were 
published during .the early 1970s. Most of the publications on Petri nets before 
1980 were listed in the annotated bibliography of the first book on Petri nets 
[Peterson, 1981]. The work done in Europe on Petri nets and the published 
papers are presented in the second Petri net book [Resig, 1985]. 
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Starting in the late 70's, Petri nets became a very active area, especially in 
Europe. Annual conferences on Applications and Theory of Petri nets have been 
held since 1979 and the proceedings published in the series of Lecture Notes of 
Computer Science by Springer Verlag. Most of the studies focused on 
information processing systems in the computer science community. An 
excellent tutorial paper was given by Professor T. Murata in 1989, which 
comprehensively presented properties, analysis, and applications of Petri nets 
and a list of references of significance [Murata, 1989]. 
A number of variations have been developed to enrich the modelling power of 
Petri nets, but most of these variations are simply additions to a basic Petri net. 
A basic Petri net structure consists of a finite set of places, a finite set of 
transitions, a finite set of arcs, and a set of tokens. The tokens, which are small 
solid dots, define markings. The set of arcs joins'· some places to some 
transitions, or some transitions to some places. A directed arc never joins a 
place to a place or a transition to a transition. Places are represented by circles 
and transitions by rectangles or bars. A Petri net containing tokens is called a 
marked Petri net. In a marked Petri net, transitions may be enabled and fired. 
Once the transition fires, the tokens are redistributed. This results in a new 
marking. For a formal definition of an ordinary Petri net, please refer to 
Murata's or Peterson's tutorial materials [Murata, 1989; Peterson, 1981]. Figure 
4.1 is an example net containing all components of a Petri net [Kimbler,1997]. 
An arc has capacity 1 by default; if other than 1, the capacity is marked on the 
arc. Places have infinite capacity by default, and transitions have no capacity, 
and cannot store tokens at all. 
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P I Place with token 
• 
Arc with capacity I 
,------''-----, Tl Transition 
(enabled) 
P2 Place 
Figure 4.1 A Simple Petri Net 
A transition is enabled when the number of tokens in each of its input places is 
at least equal to the arc weight going from the place to the transition. An 
enabled transition may fire at any time. When fired, the tokens in the input 
places are moved to output places, according to arc weights and place 
capacities. This results in a new marking of the net, a state description of all 
places, as shown in figure 4.2. 
• 
PI 
Tl Firing 
complete 
P2 
Figure 4.2 Transition of a Petri Net 
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A special kind of arc, the inhibitor arc, is used to reverse the logic of an input 
place. With an inhibitor arc, the absence of a token in the input place enables the 
transitions, not the presence. The transition in figure 4.3 cannot fire, because the 
token in P2 inhibits it. 
Figure 4.3 A Petri Net with an Inhibitor Arc 
The real world has very sophisticated logic and control structures which can be 
developed using so called the primitives (Figure 4.4) including sequence, 
conflict, concurrency, synchronization, confusion, merging and priority and 
inhibit [Kimbler, 1997). Sequence is obvious - several things happen in order. 
Conflict is not so obvious. The token in P4 enables three transitions; but when 
one of them fues, the token is removed, leaving the remaining two disabled. 
Unless we can control the timing of firing, we don't know how this net is 
resolved. Concurrency is obvious - many systems operate with concurrent 
activities, and this models it well. Synchronization is also modelled well using 
Petri Nets; when the processes leading into P8, P9, and PlO are finished, all 
three are synchronized by starting P 11. 
Confusion is another not so obvious construct. It is a combination of conflict 
and concurrency. Pl2 enables both TlI and Tl2, but if TlI fires, Tl2 is no 
longer enabled. 
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f. PS 
conflict 
[ 
conamcncy 
synchronization 
sequence 
'7'- P15 • P16 
T13 
confusion T19 T19 
merging priorily/inhibH 
Figure 4.4 Petri Net Primitives 
Merging is not quite the same as synchronization, since there is nothing 
requiring that the three transitions fire at the same time, or that all three fire 
before T17; this simply merges three parallel processes. The priority/inhibit 
construct uses the inhibit arc from P16 to control T19; as long as P16 has a 
token, T19 cannot fire. 
The Petri net as a mathematical tool possesses a number of properties, such as 
reachability, boundness, conservativeness, safety and liveness. These properties 
can be referred to [Murata, 1989; Proth and Xie, 1996; Zhou and Venkatesh, 
1998) for further details. 
To deal with the temporal performance and the net size and complexity, various 
extensions of Petri nets such as timed Petri nets, stochastic Petri nets, 
predicate/transition (prlT) nets, and coloured Petri nets have been developed. 
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When time is associated with places, it is called a timed place Petri net, or p-
timed Petri net. A token held in a place becomes available only after a certain 
period of time. Only available tokens can enable transitions. When time is 
associated with transitions, it is called a timed transition Petri net, or I-timed 
Petri net. In a timed transition Petri net, there are two modes of firing. One 
mode is that tokens are removed from the input places when a transition 
becomes enabled. The transition fires after a certain period of time and deposits 
tokens on the output places. Another mode is that tokens remain on the input 
places of an enabled transition. After the holding/delay time, the transition fires 
by removing tokens from the input places and depositing tokens on the output 
places. Formal definitions of timed place Petri net can be found in the literature, 
e.g. [Zhou and Venkatesh, 1998]. 
In chemical process plant, the place sometimes represents an operation which 
will take time. Time has to be added into the PN to represent the system 
behaviour. An example ofp-timed PN is shown in figure 4.5. In this PN, a token 
arriving at place PI will not be available for 0.25 hours before the transition T2 
can be fired. 
Stochastic timed Petri net (STPN) is introduced when time is considered as a 
random variable, or probabilistic distributions are added to the above timed Petri 
net. It is conventional to associate time delays with the transitions only in 
STPN. When the STPN allows for immediate transition firings, it is called a 
generalised stochastic Petri net. 
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T1 
PI delayed 
• O.25hrs 
T2 
Figure 4.5 A Timed Petri Net 
High-level Petri nets such as Pr/T nets (predicate Transition Nets) and coloured 
Petri nets (CPN) are introduced to deal with the net size and complexity of the 
other types of Petri nets. PrlT nets are developed from classical Petri nets by 
adding the concept of individual tokens. The tokens in Pr/T nets are no longer 
indistinguishable black dots, but have their own individuality and are therefore 
distinguishable. Places are called predicates and may carry one or more 
individual tokens which are limited by a defined capacity. Arcs transfer one or 
more individual tokens given by the token weight. An inscription on the arc 
denotes the types of tokens transferred by that arc. Transitions may be labelled 
With logical expressions. The execution rules are similar to those of classical 
Petri nets with the extension that the individual tokens must be true. CPN 
emphasize the types (e.g., production types), variables (e.g., capacities in 
buffers) and expressions (e.g., representations of the firing rules). 
CPN use different colours to distinguish tokens. In chemical process plant, we 
can use coloured tokens to carry complex information or data. For example, a 
coloured token can represent a mixture of Solvents C and D, their 
proportionality, the temperature, level, pressure, etc. When the transition fires, 
i.e. an event happens, the token will output to the next place through the 
transition. The state or states of the corresponding places will then change. This 
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will facilitate the analysis of the system behaviour and alleviate the complexity 
of a classical Petri net representation [Johnsson, 1992). 
4.2.2 Related Applications 
4.2.2.1 Modelling and Analysis 
Batch processing operations, such as start-up and shutdown, are typical 
examples of discrete-event dynamic systems. Petri nets can be used to describe 
the behaviour of discrete event activities in batch processes systematically and 
graphically. 
In Petri net modelling of batch processes, there are two primitive concepts: 
events and conditions. Events are actions that take place in the system. The 
occurrence of these events is controlled by the state of the system. The state of 
the system can be described as a set of conditions. A condition is a predicate or 
logical description of the state of the system. For an event to occur, it may be 
necessary for certain conditions to hold. These are the preconditions of the 
event. The occurrence of the event may cause the preconditions to cease to hold 
and may cause other conditions, postconditions to become true. 
In Petri net modelling, the places can be used to represent the status of a 
resource (e.g. its availability), a process plant operation (e.g. whether it is 
operating or not) and a condition (e.g. whether it is satisfied or not). The 
transitions are used to model events, e.g. the start and end of an operation. The 
presence of a token in a place indicates if a resource is available, a process plant 
operation is undergoing, or a condition is true. Multiple tokens imply 
availability of multiple resources. Ordinary Petri nets, Prrr Petri nets, coloured 
Petri nets, and timed Petri nets have been used in the logical and temporal 
modelling of batch processes. 
Yamalidou, Patsidou and Kantor [1990] examined three discrete event system 
techniques including Petri nets in batch processes. A multipurpose batch plant 
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with three units and three products was modelled as a p-timed Petri net. 
Yamalidou and Kantor [Yamalidou and Kantor, 1991] later used a set of 
modelling rules in their development of CPN modelling for networks of 
processing equipment, such as reactors, heat exchangers, separation vessels, as 
well as the connecting pipes. In their modelling, the chemical batch process is 
divided into elementary units. Petri net models for each atomic element, such as 
batch task or operation, equipment unit, valve and pipe, are defined. These sub-
nets are then connected to each other to form a global Petri net model of the 
batch process. 
Andreu, Pascal, Pingaud, and Valette [Andreu, Pascal et aI., 1994] worked on a 
hierarchical approach in manufacturing system applications to batch process 
plants, where the possibility of using a hierarchical Petri net based approach for 
describing the discrete aspect of batch systems was introduced. The hierarchical 
approach allows the decomposition of the whole problem into smaller sub-
problems within three different levels: local control level, co-ordination level 
and supervision level. The possible use of various Petri net classes at each 
hierarchical level offers an important advantage for consistency. They applied 
this method for modelling batch control through a mUltipurpose batch plant. 
Valette [Valette, 1995] addressed the benefits of a Petri net based approach in 
modelling event-driven operations of process systems. In contrast with state 
transition graph, a Petri net not only describes the system functioning 
(behavioural model), but also captures the system structure (structural model). 
Silva et al. [1998] presented a tutorial on the utilisation of Petri nets model in 
several stages of a batch process life cycle through a selected set of examples. 
Tittus et al. [1995] introduced Petri net models for plant resources and recipes. 
Two generic classes ofresources: processing devices (tanks, reactors, and other 
container-like units) and transporting devices (valves and connecting lines) are 
considered. Recipes are formulated as composed of five general elements: 
operation sequences, moving materials, and different ways to mix materials, 
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adding materials during an operation, and splitting of the materials. The Petri 
net model for the whole batch plant can then be constructed by synchronising 
different resource models with the recipe model. 
Teiji Kitajima et al [Kitajima et aI., 2000] describe a modelling and analysis 
method for batch sequential control system by using colour Petri net model. 
They propose systematic procedures to create CPN models from various 
information based on the ISA S88 standard [Batch Control, 1995], i.e. master 
recipe, equipment information and batch schedule. Batch sequential control 
systems are easily simulated and certain conflicts of operation in the process can 
be found out. This is a novel approach to model and analyse the batch sequential 
control systems. 
Bottom-up, top-down and hybrid approaches for Petri net based modelling have 
been widely used in the manufacturing field [Zhou and Venkatesh, 1998]. In the 
bottom-up approach, combining sub-Petri net models, where modular models of 
special operations or activities and combining rules are required, develops the 
global Petri net model. In the top-down approach, the transitions and places in a 
Petri net model are replaced by more detailed sub-Petri nets so that an arbitrarily 
large Petri net model can be obtained. Bottom-up focuses on a correct 
construction of interactions among subsystems or detailed operations. The 
hybrid approach uses stepwise refinement (top-down) followed by a bottom-up 
approach. In addition, CASE tools to support batch process modelling are used 
to enhance industrial applications. 
4.2.2.2 Verification and Diagnosis 
Valette [Valette, 1995] addressed the verification issue of deadlock free discrete 
event chemical processes. Through a batch process case study, the main issues 
regarding deadlocks were discussed. These included the reduction rules, where 
redundant places were eliminated and the deadlock-free batch process was 
validated. 
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Srinivasan and Venkatasubramanian [Srinivasan and Venkatasubramanian, 
1998] combined high-level Petri nets and digraphs with an object-oriented 
knowledge representation to provide a general framework for automating 
HAZOP analysis. In this framework, a system for automating HAZOP analysis 
of batch chemical processes, called Batch HAZOPExpert, was implemented in 
the object-oriented architecture of Gensym's real-time expert system G2. Tests 
on real case studies show that Batch HAZOPExpert can generate the results of 
conventional hazard review when process units and product recipe have been 
modelled. 
4.2.2.3 Supervisory control 
A batch process control system can be refined into four levels: planning, 
scheduling, supervision and co-ordination, and local control. Planning handles 
the production strategy according to a total representation of the plant. 
Scheduling addresses the route of operations in light of resource capacities of 
the process units. The aim of supervision and co-ordination is to implement 
real-time scheduling and realise the co-ordination of sub-systems in terms of 
resource availabilities and actual states. The local control implements the real-
time control, maintaining safe and steady operation of the process despite 
disturbances of process variables. The supervision and co-ordination level 
mainly deals with sequence, synchronisation, concurrence, conflicts, and 
resource sharing of discrete activities, in which Petri net has found its successful 
applications. 
In the Petri nets modelling, one of the main supervisory control tasks is to guide 
the system from a given initial marking or state to a desired final marking or 
state. Yamalidou et al. [Yamalidou and Kantor, 1991] presented a formulation 
based on linear optimisation. The optimisation objective is to find the firing 
sequence to bring the system from its initial state to a certain specified final 
state. The constraints include two sets: dynamic and operational constraints. The 
former is imposed by the dynamics of Petri nets model. The latter is derived 
from Boolean expressions of the system operational restrictions. 
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Batch plants are normally composed of several processing units working in 
parallel and/or sequence coupled by flows of mass and energy. The sequence, 
synchronisation and resource sharing are the main concerns in co-ordinate 
control. Hanisch [1998] proposed the co-ordination control modelling approach 
via ordinary Petri nets and coloured Petri nets, where the co-ordination control 
law was embedded in the Petri nets model. 
Boissel and Kantor [1993] addressed the supervisory control problems 
associated with batch process plants whose specifications can be expressed in 
terms of forbidden states. Forbidden states represent undesirable or catastrophic 
situations in which the production goals cannot be satisfied. Two kinds of 
forbidden state problems, resource conflict and deadlock, were formulated. A 
pipeless batch process plant to be controlled was modelled using a Petri net. The 
purpose of control rule synthesis was to find another simple Petri net to be 
added to the original system net, and the overall Petri net model would provide 
the optimal system behaviour. This optimal control problem was solved using a 
simulated annealing technique. 
4.2.2.4 System design 
Batch plants combine features of the continuous world as well as the discrete 
one. A comprehensive design approach for batch plants should include both 
discrete event and continuous aspects, i.e. hybrid system design. Typically, 
different techniques from each system are adopted. Petri nets can be used in the 
design of both the discrete event and interaction modules. Several approaches 
try to combine these two frameworks into one unified scheme of extended Petri 
nets able to handle mixed discrete/continuous behaviour. 
Andreu et al. [1995] addressed the interaction and co-ordination between a Petri 
net model of the discrete part of a system and a continuous model consisting of 
a set of differential algebraic equations. They did not try to integrate the 
continuous aspect within the framework of Petri net theory. The Petri net model 
of discrete section was broken down into two parts: the reference model and the 
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control model. The interaction was established by runrung another event 
generator parallel to the control module and reference model. A Petri net 
monitors a set of differential algebraic equations, and has been tested on a 
multipurpose plant with 26 units and two products in the food industry, for 
supervisory control and validation of scheduling policies. 
In another project, Srinivasan and Venkatasubramanian [1996] used Petri net 
digraph models for automating HAZOP analysis of batch process plants. High-
level Petri nets with timed transitions and coloured tokens are used to represent 
the characteristics of batch operation such as operating procedures and operator 
actions in plant operation as well as the discrete event character of batch 
processes. Subtask digraphs are used to represent the causal relationships 
between process variables at each stage of the batch recipe. The salient aspect 
for this system is that it can deal with process specific information, and generic 
information on process components which are common for many batch process 
plants. But it was limited to simple process units and didn't take the control 
loops and interlocks into account. It also generated a large number of 
unrealisable hazardous consequences compared to the Hazop expert team. 
Subsequently, Srinivasan and Venkat Venkatasubramanian [1998] developed 
Batch HAZOPExpert in G2. The knowledge about task and sub-tasks in a batch 
process are modelled hierarchically using high level Petri nets. Cause and effect 
relationships between process variables within a subtask are represented using 
subtask digraphs. Petri nets and subtask digraphs interact with each other in a 
two-tier organization to model the behaviour of batch processes. The salient 
aspects for this framework are 1) both the continuous and discrete nature of 
batch operation are represented explicitly, 2) operator actions and errors are 
modelled. This knowledge based framework for automating HAZOP analysis 
for batch chemical processes was applied to a process used for manufacturing a 
drug. However, this system is limited to process units and subtasks for which 
models have been developed. It still can't deal with control loops and interlocks. 
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4.2.3 Discussion 
Petri nets are a mature technology for representing sequences of events in the 
context of simulating discrete event systems. It is worthwhile to consider 
whether Petri nets are a suitable representation for the operating instructions in 
batch processes. In order to use them, we need to introduce a correspondence 
between the elements of a Petri net and the objects in the plant system: 
Transitions correspond to actions which cause a change in the state of the plant. 
Places correspond to states of the plant and its equipment. 
Arcs connect places to transitions and vice-versa. 
Tokens correspond to the associated state condition holding in the plant model. 
In addition to the above elements (which are standard parts of the classical Petri 
net model), to represent operating procedures, we must label one place in the net 
as the "start" (s) and one as the "finish" (f). This is necessary to allow us to 
know when a given procedure has been completed. Given the batch plant 
example introduced earlier in chapter 3, we could represent its operation as the 
Petri net shown in Figure 4.6 (Top Level View), which is shown in the state 
where we are waiting for the reaction to complete. When a token reaches the 
place marked (f), the procedure is complete. 
It is also natural to define a way of decomposing operations into smaller actions 
or steps so that commonly repeated operations can be modelled using a template 
or "model" for the operation. Therefore, using this Petri net notation, a 
decomposition of high level actions into sub-actions is achieved by defining 
"sub-nets", each of which corresponds to a single action type and gives the 
detailed sequence of actions needed to complete that action. 
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Figure 4.6 Representation using Hierarchical Petri nets 
As an example, consider a refinement of the process operation shown in the Top 
Level View of Figure 4.6. When the transition is first started the top level net is 
used. However, when transition reaches P2 or P4 then the sub-net shown in the 
lower level view is used to determine the detailed steps required to achieve the 
operation. Using this technique, a Petri net can be seen as a hierarchical 
structure, where some operations are achieved by sub-nets, which hide details 
from the top level view of the Petri net transitions. 
Petri Nets model the inherent sequence/parallelism in a fully fonned plan very 
well. They are therefore quite an attractive model for visualising the operations 
being modelled. However, Petri nets do not allow a flexible enough 
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representation of the "alternative plans" which arise from deviations from the 
intended operations of a plant. Thus, if we wish to consider what would happen 
if the order of two tasks were swapped, we find that it is very difficult to modify 
the Petri net to take account of this. 
Additionally, an experiment into the use of Petri nets to model a simple batch 
process (making a cup of tea) demonstrated that this type of representation is 
not best suited to presenting operations in a simple, easy to understand way. The 
Petri net constructed was complex and difficult to interpret, even for such a 
simple "plant", due to the inherent complexity of modelling the process at such 
a detailed level. 
The weakness of Petri nets for this application is that they integrate the places 
and transitions (i.e. the states of the plant and the actions that are performed on 
the plant) very closely. It is therefore very difficult to reason about the effect of 
varying elements from either domain. 
Consider what happens when some part of the plant is modified, or new 
equipment is added - the Petri net and the associated operating sequence are 
very likely to be wrong and the correction is hard to identify. 
If the order of operations in the procedure is changed or new ones are added 
(whether intentionally or through operator error), the effects on the Petri net are 
likely to be complex to predict, effectively meaning that a new Petri net needs to 
be constructed from scratch. 
Given these observations, it is best to use a representation which de-couples the 
operations from the equipment in a plant, so that variations in either domain can 
be considered more clearly. 
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Therefore, there are a number of problems with using Petri nets for this type of 
plant system, even without considering the issue of how to interface the Petri net 
representation to a potentially continuous plant model and its continuous 
feedback control loops. Even with the visual appeal of Petri net for simpler 
systems, these difficulties make Petri net unsuitable for the application under 
consideration. 
For the purposes of our hazard identification system, we aim to model all the 
possible operating sequences of the plant by using local constraints between 
actions - without having to commit to a particular complete plan. This method 
can be used to determine if a given whole plan satisfies the constraints, or 
(ultimately) to generate an optimal plan sequence for the operation from a 
number of actions specified. 
Some final remarks on Petri nets serve to illustrate the range of problems which 
must be tackled when modelling batch processes accurately: 
1) Petri nets are not able to represent how the process parameters such as 
flow, temperature, and level propagate within the system. 
2) In batch hazard identification, Petri nets are not likely to be able to 
represent failure mode, for example, when a failure state occurs, how the 
operator reacts. Petri nets also seem not to be able to represent the 
unhealthy states when a fault occurs. 
3) Petri nets are not able to reason between cause(s) and consequence(s), 
for example, what will happen if an event takes longer or less time than 
usual, or what will happen if some of events are missed or swapped. 
4) Petri nets are also unlikely to represent the control loop with continuous 
behaviour which appears to be very common in batch processing. 
5) Using Petri nets, the modelling suffers from too much complexity. In 
chapter 3, even a small case study needs a fairly complicated 
representation. 
6) Using Petri nets, the models tend to oversimplify the real scenarios. 
Thus making it difficult to model some real world situations. 
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4.3 Qualitative Reasoning 
4.3.1 Overview 
Qualitative reasoning (QR) was originated by de Kleer's investigation on how 
qualitative and quantitative knowledge interacted in solving a subset of simple 
mechanics problems [Kleer, 1977]. Qualitative reasoning is motivated by two 
objectives [Weld and Kleer, 1990] [Williams and Kleer, 1991]: 
1) modelling real world situations and human artefacts m order to 
support the reasoning activities of engineers; 
2) imitating engineers' thinking. Since it focuses on scientific and 
engineering domains, it is often also known by another name: qualitative 
physics. 
Qualitative reasoning can be used to model physical systems with incomplete 
information from which engineers can obtain useful information without 
differential equations. In our daily lives, we can usually figure out what is 
happening around us and how we will be affected with less precise and 
complete information. We know the basic relations between the variables in a 
system. Qualitative models can be used to capture and simulate the incomplete 
knowledge in a model to obtain a rough outline of the system behaviour. 
Furthermore, as more information about the system becomes available, a more 
accurate description can be provided. 
There are mainly three ontologies in QR approach, relating to the mam 
emphasis of modelling, i.e., device, process and constraint ontologies 
[Werthner, 1994]. The most commonly used ontologies are the device ontology 
[Kleer and Brown, 1984] and the process ontology [Forbus, 1984]. The device 
ontology is motivated by network theory and system dynamics. It interprets 
physical systems as networks of devices whose interactions are through a fixed 
set of units. The process ontology interprets that the change of the system is 
caused by process changes, corresponding to real world phenomena. Another 
approach, constraint ontology refers to the mathematical description of dynamic 
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systems in the fonn of qualitative differential equations [Kleer and Brown, 
1984]. 
Some distinguishable remarks in qualitative reasorung are as discussed as 
followed: 
Compositionality: One goal of qualitative physics is to fonnalize the modelling 
process itself. Compositionality concerns the ability to combine representations 
for different aspects of a phenomenon or system to create a representation of the 
phenomenon or system as a whole. 
Resolution: The level of infonnation detail in a representation. One goal of 
qualitative reasoning is to understand how little infonnation is needed to draw 
useful conclusions. High resolution draws more precise conclusions while low 
resolution reveals what the interesting questions are. The conclusions drawn 
from low resolution infonnation usually suffer from the problem of ambiguity. 
Qualitative representation: Qualitative representation - what to represent, and 
how to represent it qualitatively is a core issue in QR, since it is used to draw 
the conclusion desired. The first step in qualitative representation is to indicate a 
quantity by whether or not it is "nonnal" [Abbot, 1988]. This is useful for 
certain diagnosis and monitoring tasks because it is can express the difference 
between something working and not working. The sign algebra is used to 
represent continuous parameters as either -, + or 0 corresponding to quantitative 
values which are negative, positive, or zero. Ordinal relations or the quantity 
space [Forbus, 1984] supports qualitative reasoning about dynamics. Landmark 
values [Kuipers, 1986] are constant points of comparison introduced where the 
qualitative value of a variable changes. Finite algebras have also been used 
based on a finite set oflabels, i.e., very small, small, nonnal, large, very large. 
Qualitative state: A set of propositions that characterize a qualitatively distinct 
behaviour of a system [Forbus, 1996]. A qualitative state describing a falling 
ball, for instance, would include infonnation about what physical processes are 
occurring (e.g., motion downwards, acceleration due to gravity) and how the 
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parameters of the ball are changing (e.g., its position is getting lower and its 
downward velocity is getting larger). A qualitative state can abstractly represent 
an infinite number of quantitative states. Although the position and velocity of 
the ball are different at each distinct moment during its fall, the qualitative state 
of its motion is unchanged until the ball collides with the ground. The time over 
which the state of the ball falling holds is thought of as an interval, ending when 
the ball collides with the ground. The collision with the ground can be 
represented via a transition between two states. A collection of such qualitative 
states and transitions is called an envisionment [Kleer, 1977]. Many dynamical 
conclusions including the discovery of new landmark values can be drawn from 
an envisionment. 
Time: Time is very important in QR because significant change of the states 
evolves along with the time. However, significant landmarks which decide these 
changes are not predetermined. They are discovered via simulation. New 
landmark values then modify the qualitative sets of variables which further 
decide when and what change in states will happen. 
Qualitative Simulation: The purpose of qualitative simulation (e.g., QSIM 
[Kuipers, 1986, 1994]) is to derive the behaviour of a dynamic system with 
weak information about it. Physical systems are modelled with qualitative 
differential equations. Qualitative simulation requires neither a complete 
structural description of the physical system nor a fully specified initial state. 
The major strength of qualitative simulation is the prediction of all physically 
possible behaviours derivable from this incomplete knowledge. In engineering 
[Forbus and Falkenhainer, 1990], qualitative simulation is mainly used for 
monitoring and diagnosis. 
Nonfunction-in-structure: A basic component of a device should not be a 
function of the entire device, i.e., the effects of the basic component are local, 
and should not refer to any other component. 
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Causality: what events can cause what other events. There are three 
relationships between them: I) no relationship; 2) one event causes another 
event only; 3) one event causes another event via a causal link. 
4.3.2 Related Applications 
4.3.2.1 Computer aided Hazop 
Catino et al. [Catino, Grantham et aI., 1991] from Pennsylvania University 
adopted a process approach to plant modelling which is based on the Qualitative 
Process Theory of Forbus [Forbus, 1984]. A set of constraints between 
qualitative variables can be generated, as SDG models or QSIM (Qualitative 
Simulation) constraints, by the process model so as to determine the state of the 
plant and its possible behaviours. This approach is powerful in that it supports 
automatic generation of the· processes to suit the different states of the plant. 
However, it suffers the problem of increased computational complexity because 
there are many variables to be processed and prediction of the plant behaviour is 
often ambiguous. 
4.3.2.2 Planning 
Qualitative physics is used to provide predictions with incomplete information 
and to determine what methods might achieve a desired effect. This makes it 
reasonable that qualitative reasoning could be carried out entirely in a planner, 
by compiling the domain theory and physics into operators and inference rules 
[Hogge, 1987]. Another different approach is to treat actions as another kind of 
state transition in qualitative simulation [Forbus, 1989]. This can be effective if 
qualitative reasoning is interleaved with execution monitoring [Drabble, 1993], 
or if used with a mixture of backward and forward reasoning with partial states 
[Coste, 1994]. 
4.3 .2.3 Monitoring and diagnosis 
Monitoring a system requires summarizing its behaviour at a level of 
description that is useful for taking action. Diagnosis requires isolating the 
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causes of a problem using incomplete knowledge about which particular parts 
have failed. Qualitative models provide sufficient resolution and the framework 
for fault isolation and detection. 
Operative diagnosis tasks are those where the system being monitored must 
continue being operated in spite of faults. One example of operative diagnosis is 
diagnosing engine trouble in civilian commercial aircraft. FaultFinder [Abbott, 
Schutte et aI., 1987] is intended to detect engine trouble and provide easily 
understood advice to pilots. FaultFinder compares engine data with a numerical 
simulation to detect the commencement of a problem. A causal model, using 
low resolution qualitative information ("working" or "not working") is used to 
construct failure hypotheses, to be communicated to the pilot in a combination 
of natural language and graphics. 
QR is also applied in the safety area of Process Engineering [McCoy, et aI., 
1999] where the most common applications are diagnosis of faults in operating 
plants and identification of potential hazards in a plant design. The frameworks 
adopted by the researches are either component based or process based 
approach where rules and causal links between variables are added. 
4.3.3 Discussion 
One of the major problems of QR has been the control of ambiguity in the 
predictions produced by its models. Many simple arithmetic operations such as 
addition are entirely ambiguous when transposed into the qualitative domain. 
This type of ambiguity results in a severely branching tree of predicted 
behaviours, and seriously limits the size of models whose behaviour can be 
simulated - and presented to a user in an intelligible way. 
For this reason, we chose to develop a more strongly object-oriented, state-
based, component-centred approach to system modelling, in which numerical 
quantities could be used as well as supporting qualitative reasoning in the shape 
of local constraints between objects considered to be physically connected. 
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Ambiguity of behaviour will doubtless remain within this type of model, but we 
hope that it will be better controlled. 
4.4 AI Planning 
4.4.1 Overview 
Planning is designing the behaviour of some entity, either an individual, a 
group, or an organization [Rich, 1991]' The output of the design is called a plan. 
Automating planning is motivated by two reasons: 
(1) it might cast light on how people design their behaviour 
(2) complex planning problems might be solved better with the aid of 
computers. 
There are a wide variety of planning problems differentiated by the types of 
their inputs and outputs. Typically, planning problems get more and more 
difficult as more flexible inputs are allowed and fewer constraints on the output 
are required. The classical approach to planning problems is to start from 
specifications of the effects of actions, and then try to infer a set of actions that 
bring about a particular state of interaction. 
When planning research started in the 1960s, it was mainly seen as an 
application of two standard AI techniques: search and theorem proving. Search 
was seen as crucial to AI from the beginning until today. Many problems can be 
solved by applying a sequence of transformations starting from an initial 
problem state. At each step, there is usually a choice of which transformation to 
apply, most of which won't eventually lead to a complete solution, so it's 
necessary to keep track of partial solution states and return or backtrack to them 
when previous choices don't work out. The 'transformations' are usually called 
operators. 
The classical planning approach has the following assumptions: 
• Assume plans are sequences of actions; 
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• Take the purpose of a plan to bring about a situation satisfying a 
description; 
• Treat the outcome of every action as perfectly predictable. 
The assumptions are quite reasonable in various applications. For example, 
planning a route through a city can be thought of as finding a series of blocks to 
traverse. It is not in fact perfectly predictable that the attempt to traverse a block 
will get you from one intersection to the next, but in most cases it is reasonable 
to treat it as predictable and worry about untraversable blocks when they are 
encountered. 
The other strand that led through classical planning was the reduction of 
planning to theorem proving. In 1960, John McCarthy, proposed the use of 
predicate-calculus reasoning to guide intelligent behaviour, and the first big 
realization of this idea was Green's [Green, 1969] program QA3, which solved 
a variety of simple problems expressed in predicate calculus. A set of planning 
problems expressed in terms of McCarthy's situation calculus in which axioms 
about what actions led to what situations were used to deduce action sequences. 
However, this proposal is hard to solve the problem since there would be a lot of 
situations generated most of which are not what we are interested in. On the 
other hand, GPS (General Problem Solver) [Newell and Simon, 1963] had the 
flaw that in expressing a new class of problems, it required the representation of 
not just the legal operators, but also domain dependent procedures for matching 
search states, i.e., define all the possible states based on domain knowledge. An 
"operator-difference table" that recorded which operators were relevant to 
reducing the differences was found by the match er. Creating all these 
procedures and tables was tedious, and often seemed to amount to giving the 
program too many hints. 
In 1969, the AI group at Stanford Research Institute in Palo Alto, California, 
found a way to get the best of both approaches while avoiding many of the 
weaknesses. This group [Fikes and Nilsson, 1971] devised a version ofGPS that 
worked directly from action definitions stated in a form similar to that of the 
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situation calculus. Each action was defined in terms of its preconditions and 
effects, stated as predicate-calculus atomic formulas. The action definition was 
used to edit descriptions of situations instead of deducing properties of 
situations. An action's effects were of two varieties: additions and deletions. 
Generating a new situation description from an old one was a matter of deleting 
all the atomic formulas in the delete list and adding all the ones in the add list. 
All other formulas in the old situation description were carried over. This 
problem solver was called STRIPS ("Stanford Research Institute Problem 
Solver"). It was able to solve bigger problems than previous approaches, and 
was used as the planner for the Shakey robot [Fikes and Nilsson, 1971]. STRIPS 
remains influential, especially for the ideas it embodies about representation and 
temporal change. 
Given a set of subgoals, a non-interleaved or linear planner can find plans to 
solve each subgoal, but then it can only combine them by placing all the steps 
for one subplan before or after all the steps of the others. Many early planners of 
the 1970s were non-interleaved, and thus were incomplete - they could not 
always find a solution when one existed. HACKER, introduced [Sussman, 
1975] the idea of protecting subgoals. The first true nonlinear (partial order) 
planner, though, was NOAH [Sacerdoti, 1975] which was further improved 
upon by the program Nonlin [Tate, 1977]. These programs explored a search 
space of partial plans, collections of plan steps that achieved some of the goals 
in the problem statement. Each plan step referred to a single action that would 
be part of the final plan. Actions have preconditions, which would become new 
sub goals to be achieved. Taking a step in the search space meant committing to 
achieving sub goals with a new or existing plan step. In these planners, the plan 
steps did not have to be kept in a linear order, and thus they have often been 
referred to as "nonlinear". Nowadays they are more likely to be called partial 
order planners. Subsequent planning systems, such as TWEAK [Chapman, 
1987] used constraint posting as a central technique. 
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One important research strand was the idea of goal regression. Given a goal that 
must be achieved at a point in a partial plan, what must be true before a previous 
action for it to become true at the right point? For example, suppose a partial 
plan contains the steps Drive truck 3 to Smithville, and Put load 15 into 
warehouse A in Smithville, and suppose that a precondition of the latter step is 
that load 15 be in Smithville. Regressing the precondition across the truck 
driving step yields the new goal: Either load 15 is on truck 3 or it is already in 
Smithville, which must be true before the truck is driven to Smithville if that 
step is to result in load 15 being in the right place at the right time. This idea 
was first articulated in the field of program analysis and synthesis [Dijkstra, 
1976]. It was applied to planning by Waldinger [Waldinger, 1977] and Warren 
[Warren, 1974] in the mid-seventies, and formalized by Pednault in the eighties 
[Pednault, 1989]. Their systems searched a space of partial plans that are totally 
ordered throughout. However, total ordering does not prevent the insertion of 
new steps (e.g., Put load 15 onto truck 3) between existing steps. 
In the late eighties, McAllester and Rosenblitt [McA1lester and Rosenblitt, 
1991] proved the completeness of a partial order planning algorithm which is 
now called SNLP. It developed from partial order planners like SlPE and 
Nonlin. McAllester and Rosenblitt's algorithm uses only a basic STRIPS style 
representation of actions. The output of the algorithm is a totally ordered 
sequence of actions, but it produces them by working through a search space of 
partial plans, each represented as a collection of four things: 
• A partially ordered set of steps; 
• A set of precondition goals associated with each step, which were 
conditions to be made true before that step in every totally ordered 
completion of the partial plan; 
• A set of causal links that commit one step to achieving a precondition of 
another; 
• A set of separation links that commit a step to be ordered so that it 
cannot interfere with a causal link. 
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The operators in this search space add steps and links until a plan is reached that 
has no unachieved preconditions. 
c 
B A 
Start State 
Figure 4.7 An example planning problem 
A 
B 
C 
Goal State 
A typical planning example, know as the Sussman anomaly, is shown in Figure 
4.7. It can be explained as follows. 
Start state: There are three blocks labelled A, B, and C where the precondition 
are Clear(B), Clear(C) and on(C A), i.e. blocks B and C are clear, arid block C is 
on blockA. 
Operators: An action an agent might take is "Move a block from the table to 
the top of another block". The operator can be generalised as stack(?x ?y) where 
?x and ?y are variables. The preconditions of this actions are clear(?x) and 
c1ear(?y). The postcondition is on(?x ?y) and the condition clear(?y) is removed. 
Another action is "Move a block which is currently on top of another block to 
the table." The operator can be generalised as unstuck(?x ?y). The precondition 
of this action is clear(?x) and the postconditions are c1ear(?y) and on(?x table). 
Goal-state description: The desired situation is block A on top of block B and 
block B on top of block C, i.e. on(A B) and on(B C). 
Planning: To achieve on(A B), the sub-plan is unstack(C A) followed by 
stack(A B); to achieve on(B C), the sub-plan consists of only one action which 
is stack(B C). However, given the initial state no matter how the two sub-plans 
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are order one before the other the goal state cannot be reached because of the 
conflict in preconditions and postconditions. A feasible plan can only be 
achieved by inserting the sub-plan stack(B C) in between the two actions of the 
other sub-plan, which results in unstuck(C A), stack(B C) and stack(B A). This 
example shows clearly that to achieve an overall goal, it is not sufficient just to 
consider how each sub-goal is achieved and then ordering the sub-plans; this is 
because the sub-plans may have to be interleaved. 
4.4.2 Related Applications 
The past researches just discussed concentrated in the field of planning theory. 
It seems that AI planning has reached a significant maturity in which the 
specialised techniques it offers are being successfully applied to real word 
problems [Aylett, Petley et al. 2000]. The approach for dealing with the 
complexity of general purpose planning is to specialize the domain still further, 
and to try to exploit restrictions that may arise. It attempts in expert systems to 
solve particular planning problems in very particular domains. 
One such case is that of planning plant operating procedures for chemical plant 
[Aylett, Soutter et al., 2000]. It's interesting to think about the relationship of 
this problem to classical planning. It obeys the classical assumption (e.g., the 
assumption that the world is passive and perfectly known), but would be 
difficult to translate into STRIPS style add lists and delete lists. The translation 
would probably involve an exponentially increasing number of action definition 
rules. Thus, Least commitment planning and Hierarchical task networks were 
used to reduce search spaces [Aylett, Petley et al. 2000]. 
A similar situation is scheduling, which aims to finding a good order to perform 
a series of known tasks. Scheduling problems arise repeatedly in industry. 
Scheduling problems come in many different forms. They differ in the ways that 
tasks consume resources. For example, in job shop problems a task will require 
a machine, which it releases at the end, while in transportation problems, fuel 
can be consumed at a rate independent of the rate at which it is replenished. 
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( Problems also differ in the kind of ordering constraints they allow for and they 
differ in how free the scheduler is to change steps, e.g., if each task must be 
executed in a different location, then changing them consequently changes the 
total travel time of the schedule. Because of all this variety, it is impossible to 
work out a single general purpose scheduling algorithm that works well in all 
cases. Each problem must be approached on its own, and its solution almost 
always requires the use of heuristics. In short, it is an excellent field for the 
application of tools from the AI toolkit. 
It is usually fairly easy to fmd a feasible schedule, that is, one that does not 
violate any ordering or resource-bound constraints. Then one can focus on ways 
to improve it. It is not usually necessary to get all the way to optimality in order 
for the effort to be worthwhile. 
4.4.3 Discussion 
AI planning is able to choose and order the sequence of actions needed to 
achieve a set of objectives and help detect and resolve conflicts between the 
steps needed to achieve different objectives. Hence, AI planning has its 
potential ability to solve the real problem, such as safety analysis of batch 
process plants. 
4.5 Conclusions 
Some of the important messages of this work so far are: 
Concentration on Petri Nets technology for representing operating plans IS 
inappropriate for this domain. Petri Nets are not sufficiently flexible to model 
the effect of operations on a state-based plant model where either the plant or 
the instructions are subject to variation. 
Modeling actions in a plant with simple STRIPS operators is insufficient, 
because the problem of determining if an action will succeed is a non-local 
search, initiated at runtime, wherever flow is concerned. 
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The connectivity of a plant may be determined dynamically by run-time 
conditions during operation of the plant. In domains such as the example of 
making a cup of tea, connections may be contingent on spatial relationships 
between equipment items (e.g. the kettle must be above the cup in order to pour 
water from the kettle to the cup). 
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Chapter 5 
System Design 
5.1 State-based Approach 
The proposed system is modelled and implemented usmg a state-based 
approach as the state-based approach is very useful for capturing clear, concise, 
and unambiguous specifications [Bowen, 2005]. To apply the state-based 
approach the following tasks must be completed: 
• Model the state of each unit in the system; 
• Write down the state invariant, i.e., all the reasonable conditions 
describing the relationships between parts of the state; 
• Specify the precondition of each operation which must be true before an 
operation can be carried out; 
• Give appropriate initial values to the state of each unit. 
The state of a unit is a collection of the essential attributes, e.g., temperature, 
level and pressure. Each of the state attributes should satisfy the state invariant. 
The operations are a set of sequential actions that will be applied to the plant for 
the purposes of start-up, shutdown, etc. Each time when an action is executed, it 
will transform the state of the plant from its current state (the state before the 
action) to the goal state (the desired state after the action). At the beginning, 
each component in the plant needs to be given an initial valid value. The 
precondition of an operation is the state of the component( s) under which the 
action can be applied successfully. If the precondition is met then the operation 
will be applied and the plant will take on the new state. Otherwise, the action 
will not be applied then the whole operation fails and the plant will not reach its 
goal state. 
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In the coffee making example given in chapter 3, the kettle has the state level, 
which is a non-negative integer type. The state level should satisfy the 
invariants at the beginning, i.e., the level should not exceed the maximum 
capacity of the kettle, 0 < level < max before the operation starts. When the 
kettle is moved under the kitchen tap and the kitchen tap is open, the level of 
the kettle will be incremented which indicates the kettle is being filled. The 
kettle is permitted to be filled by water only if the kettle is not already full. That 
is, before performing the action "fill". Hence, the state before the action is level 
< max. The state after the action might be 50% of the maximum capacity 
subject to what the post-condition was specified for the action. If the 
precondition was not satisfied, for example, the initial state of the kettle had 
already been 100% then the action "fill water in an electrical kettle" would not 
have been performed successfully. 
As a summary, the state-based approach focuses on the state of the components 
in the plant and all the required actions that will be performed. It uses the 
mathematical and logical values to form an abstract view of the system. In the 
example discussed above, the state invariants are represented with mathematical 
. values, e.g., 50% level, while the precondition of each action is expressed as 
logical conditions. Therefore, this approach facilitates the modelling and 
simulation of process plants. 
5.2 CHECKOP System architecture 
The prototype CHECKOP system is an application developed by the author 
aiming at automating the HAZOPing chemical batch processing. It has gone 
through two iterations of design and implementation. The initial prototype of 
CHECKOP was written using the knowledge-based system tooIkit CLIPS to 
prove the concepts. CHECKOP has also been re-designed and re-implemented 
in C++ to run under windows. 
Figure 5.1 shows the overall system architecture ofCHECKOP. The system has 
three main components: the Parser, the Deviation Generator and the Simulation 
60 
Engine (see Figure 5.1). The Parser reads the input files prepared by the user 
and converts the information into an internal form for processing by the other 
two components. The information provided by the user is specific to the plant 
that is required to be HAZOPed. One of the files gives details about the items of 
equipment in the plant, their connectivity and their current states. The other file 
contains a set of operating instructions to be applied to the plant to bring the 
plant from its current state to its goal state, while also achieving the production 
of a batch of product. 
The Deviation Generator systematically applies the deviation guidewords - no, 
early and late - to the operating procedure so that the Simulation Engine can 
infer what will be the consequence if a certain instruction in the procedure is not 
executed, or the instruction is carried out too early or too late. Having gone 
through all the deviations, the Simulation Engine will produce a report file 
providing warnings against any undesirable situations that may result from the 
deviations. To carry out the simulation the Simulation Engine requires the 
Action Model Library which provides information about actions that can be 
performed on different pieces of equipment and the effects of those actions. 
The pseudo code of CHECKOP based algorithm is given in the appendix at the 
end of this chapter. 
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Figure 5.1 CHECKOP System Architecture 
5.3 Plant Description 
An object-oriented approach is used to describe the plant. Consider the batch 
plant as shown in Figure 5.2; each item in the plant is declared in the plant 
description file. For each item at least the following basic information is given: 
• The type of unit it belongs to; 
• Which other plant items it is connected to; 
• What subunit it contains. 
Other appropriate information related to a plant item will also be stored with 
that plant item. Table 5.1 provides some example descriptions of the plant items 
found in figure 5.2. 
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tank1 D2 
rem:tantB 
cwlnlet 
valve' 01 
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reactantS] 
Figure 5.2 A Simple Batch Plant 
Fonnal plant item declaration Explanation 
instance( tank I 0 I isa tank, TanklOI is a tank 
[ 
content info [reactantA), The content of the tank is reactantA 
outports info [out is [pumpI01,inJ] The outlet of the tank is connected to 
D· the inlet of pump 10 1 
instance(pump 101 isa pump, Pump101 is a pump 
[ 
status is offline, The status ofthe pump is off-line 
outports info [out is [valve101,inJ] The outlet of the pump is connected 
D· to the inlet ofvalve101 
instance(valve101 isa valve, Valve 10 1 is a valve 
[ 
status is closed, The status of the valve is closed 
outports info [out IS [reactor 1 01, The outlet of the valve is connected 
in2)) to inlet 2 ofreactor101 
D· 
instance(reactor101 isa Reactor101 is a stirred-tank-reactor 
stirred_tank Jeactor, 
63 
[ The outlet 1 of the reactor is 
outports info [out! is [valvel03,in], connected to the inlet of valve 101 
out2 is [valvel06,in]], and outlet 2 is connected to valve 
heatSink info [hout is 106 
[jacketlOl,hinJ], The heat of the reactor is transferred 
reaction info [reaction_ab -p] to jacket 101 
D. The intended reaction IS called 
reaction_ab ...P 
Table 5.1 Explanation of Simple Plant Description 
5.4 Operating Procedure Description 
In order for the CHECKOP system to analyse an operating procedure, the 
instructions have to be written following the templates. In general, instructions 
that are written in natural language style are difficult for the computer to 
understand and their meaning may also be ambiguous. Therefore, to avoid 
natural language processing, an operating procedure written as input to 
CHECKOP strictly follows the templates below: 
Template 1: Item Action 
Example: valvelOl open 
Template 2: Item Action until Condition 
Example: mixer on until elapsed-time 20 minutes 
Template 3: Item} Action Item2 Filler-word Fluid until Condition 
Example: reactorl0l fill-from tankl0l with reactantA until volume 30 
percent 
The duration for some other actions could be very critical, for example, react the 
content in reactor 101 for 35 minutes. If the action is executed less than the 
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specified time then the reaction may not be have completed and therefore the 
operator may not get the right material and the right quantity of the final 
product. If the action is executed longer than the specified time then the product 
may also be ruined or the plant may reach a dangerous state. For these kinds of 
critical instruction, either template 2 or template 3 is used to represent the 
condition. For example, the action "react the content in reactor 101 for 35 
minutes" would be represented using template 2 as "reactorl01 react_content 
until elapsed_time 35 minutes" since it involves only one plant item. 
Given the plant shown in figure 5.2, the instructions for charging reactorlOI 
with reactantA can be expressed as: 
valvelOl open 
pumplOl start 
reactorlOl fill-from tanklOl with reactantA 
until volume 30 percent 
pumplOl stop 
valvelOl close 
The file containing the operating instructions for operating the plant is read in 
by CHECKOP and translated into its internal form. 
5.5 The Action Model Library 
Associated with each plant item type there is an action model in the Action 
Model Library. The model specifies the operations that can be carried out on 
that type of plant item. 
An action model first translates all templates (described in section 5.3) into a 
common format: 
Action (Iteml, Modifier) 
where 
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• Action refers to action keywords such asfill-from, open, close 
• Iteml refers to units which will perform the action, e.g., reactor 101 
• The fields Action and Iteml are compulsory 
• Modifier can be null or not null. 
When the field Modifier is null, the template for such action model becomes 
Action (Iteml) 
Otherwise 
Modifier will be further extended into: 
[Item2, Fluid, Condition] 
where 
Item2 refers to the units where the action performs on, e.g., tanklOI 
Fluid refers to the material performed by the action, e.g., reactantA 
Condition refers to the termination condition of the action. It can be a time 
termination or a post-condition as the result of the action, an example IS 
elapsed-time 20 minutes, and another example is volume 30 percent. 
For each action the pre-conditions that must be true before the action and the 
post-conditions after the action are stated. For example, the actions for a valve 
can be open or close. In general, there is no pre-condition for opening or closing 
a valve. However, the post-condition for opening a valve is that a flow path 
exists between the upstream unit and the downstream unit. The post-condition 
for closing a valve is that the flow path between the upstream unit and the 
downstream unit no longer exists. 
The actions for a pump can be start or stop. To start a pump, the pre-conditions 
are that there must be a flow path between the source of a fluid and the pump 
and there must be a flow path between the pump and the sink. If the pre-
conditions are not met then start operation will generate a warning message. 
The post-condition of starting a pump is that there is a flow between the source 
and the sink. On the other hand, there is no pre-condition for stopping a pump 
and the post-condition of stopping a pump is that there is no flow between the 
source and the sink. 
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5.6 The Deviation Generator 
The Deviation Generator applies the guide words no, early and late 
systematically to the operating instructions to generate different versions of the 
operating procedure. This allows CHECKOP to explore the consequences of 
different scenarios that could result from operator human errors. 
By applying the guideword no to the following example procedure: 
(1) valve101 open 
(2) pumplOl start 
(3) reactor101 fill-from tank101 with reactantA until 
volume 30 percent 
(4) pump101 stop 
(5) valve101 close 
the Deviation Generator will remove systematically one instruction at a time 
from the procedure, which will result in five different procedures. Each 
representing an error of omission, i.e. an operator failed, or forgot, to carry out a 
specified instruction. 
For example, procedure with instruction 1 omitted: 
(2) pump101 start 
(3) reactor101 fill-from tank101 with reactantA until 
volume 30 percent 
(4) pump101 stop 
(5) valve101 close 
Procedure with instruction 2 omitted: 
(1) valve101 open 
(3) reactor101 fill-from tank101 with reactantA until 
volume 30 percent 
(4) pump101 stop 
67 
(5) valve101 close 
When the guide word early is applied to the procedure, instructions are moved 
earlier in the procedure. For example, moving the instruction "reactorlOI fill-
from tanklOI with reactantA until volume 30 percent" two steps forward will 
result in the procedure: 
(3) reactor101 fill-from tank101 with reactantA until 
volume 30 percent 
(1) valve101 open 
(2) pump101 start 
(4) pump101 stop 
(5) valve101 close 
All the different procedures generating by the Deviation Generator are passed to 
the Simulation Engine for analysis to identify operability problems and potential 
hazardous situations. 
5.7 Simulation Engine 
The heart of the CHECKOP system is the simulation engine. Given an operating 
procedure, it applies the instructions one at a time and simulates its effect by 
changing the state of the plant. Therefore, the plant moves from one state to 
another until all the instructions are completed. However, the execution of a 
procedure may not always reach its end. This is because when the simulation 
engine detects an operability problem or hazardous situation it will report to the 
user. Consider the procedure given earlier in this section where the instruction 
"valve I 0 I open" was missing, the following warning will be generated: there is 
no flow path between tank 10 I and reactor 1 0 1 for filling. The simulation engine 
identifies that the fill action cannot be completed (consequence) because no 
flow path exists between the source and the sink (due to the instruction 
"valvelOI open" is missing. 
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The simulation engine will work systematically through all the procedures 
generated by the deviation generator. It can 'propagate' the causal relationship 
within the system in the sense that, for example, when no flow path between 
tanklOI and reactorlOI causes reactorlOI not to be filled with the intended 
material from tanklOI, the simulation engine will then detect it is impossible to 
execute the action 'reactorlOI react_content until elapsed_time 35 minutes' 
because not all the required materials are present in the reactor. Therefore, an 
effect of a previous step is "propagated" and considered in future steps. 
The simulation engine is used together within an action model. Consider its 
usage in the fill from action model, i.e. Iteml.fil/Jrom{item2, material, 
intention) : 
If a jlowpath does not exist between iteml and item2 
then report conseuqnce. 
If the input volume plus the current volume in iteml is greater than the 
capacity of item 1 
then report consequence. 
If the material in item2 is not the intended material 
then report consequence. 
If there is already material in iteml 
Then look up reaction model to check if the existing material and 
the input material will create a hazardous reaction 
If yes then report hazard. 
The above algorithm shows how the simulation engine is integrated with the 
different models such as reaction model and flow path model to identify hazards. 
It applies the rules from the different models whenever applicable. These rules 
mayor may not make changes to the states of the equipment units. The 
simulation engine can detect hazards as the direct result of an action or the result 
of a sequence of actions because of the state changes in the plant. 
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5.8 Flow Path Analysis 
CHECKOP solves one of the typical problems encountered in this and another 
related area - Operating Procedure Synthesis (OPS). The problem is that of how 
to detennine the effect on flow due to actions involving opening or closing a 
valve. For example, if two valves are present in sequence in the same line, then 
opening one of them will not produce a flow through it if the other valve is 
closed. Similarly, if the two valves are in parallel sections, then closing one will 
not necessarily prevent fluid from flowing. This flow modeling problem cannot 
be solved ahead of time and must be found during a run-time simulation of the 
system. This means that simple STRlPS-style operators (with associated lists of 
preconditions and effects) are inadequate for modeling the effects of actions in 
this domain, if the effects to be modeled include the facts of flow existing at 
different places in the plant. 
In its use of state-based simulation and run-time search for flow path 
connections, CHECKOP uses the "action synergy" approach to flow modeling 
and generating the effects of valve operations, as also explored in the work of 
Soutter (1997). In OPS systems, the action synergy approach is used to find safe 
sequences of valve operations to achieve planning goals, given that the 
operations will have overlapping and perhaps conflicting effects on the flows in 
the plant. In CHECKOP, the aim is to simulate accurately when flows are 
possible and when they are not possible. 
The developed flow path analysis model detects whether flow paths exist 
between two plant items. If yes, flow will propagate through the paths; 
otherwise, it will stop at where the paths are blocked. The algorithm for 
jlowpath_exist (equipmentl, equipment2) is: 
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Q 
All immediate upstream items of equipment2 are placed in a set X 
If Xis empty 
then no existing path 
else Remove items that are in the set X which are blocked 
if Xis empty 
then no existing path 
else If any of the remaining items in set X is equipment 1 
Then a flow path exists between equipmentl and 
equipment 2 
Else for each item Y in the set X call 
flowpath_exist(equipmentl, n. 
5.9 Reaction Model 
In a batch process, a reaction could lead to a change of state such as the amount 
or heat content of the materials in an equipment unit. For example, in an action 
'reactorl0l react_content until elapsed_time 35 minutes', the reaction could 
cause the amount of both reactant A and reactant B decrease and of the final 
product increase. It may also generate heat and increase the temperature. When 
the reaction is complete the heat generation process is stopped. As mentioned 
above, different material will create different reactions. Therefore, reaction 
should be modelled individually due to its unique characteristics so that the 
simulation engine could identify the consequence if there is an abnormal 
reaction or when a reaction is terminated earlier or later in terms of clock time. 
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5.10 Overall Algorithm 
Given the system architecture and the component description, the overall system 
algorithm is described below: 
Load library information 
Load plant input file 
Load operating procedure and translate each instruction into the form 
A ction( object,predicate, modifier) 
Enumerate and choose guidewords 
Apply each guideword one by one 
For each action 
Choose the appropriate template 
Execute action 
If it is a flow related action 
Then check whether the flow path exists 
check whether the propagation rule is applicable 
update the state of the object(s) 
If it is reaction related action 
Then check the reaction rule 
update the state of the object 
Else 
update the state of the object 
5.11 Summary 
To automate the batch hazaop analysis, the Parser is used to load the input files 
prepared by the user and converts the plant information into an internal format 
for processing. The plant information includes what the units, their current 
states before the instructions are executed, their subunits, and their 
environmental units are, the plant layout, and the current states after the 
propagation rule is applied. The Deviation Generator then systematically 
applies the deviation guidewords such as no, early and late to the instructions 
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which are also parsed into an internal fonmit to be match predefined templates 
which are designed in the action model. The action model can be reused for 
other plants or added depending on how complex the instructions are. The 
Simulation Engine, which is based on 'common sense' rule, then infers what 
will be the consequence if a certain instruction in the procedure is not executed, 
or the instruction is carried out too early or too late. 
73 
Chapter 6 
Examples and Discussion 
This chapter uses three examples to illustrate the HAZOP capability of 
CHECKOP and for the purpose of identifying the limitations of the current 
prototype. The first example is a tea making process which is a more 
complicated version than the coffee making process as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Two simple batch reactor plants are also used. The two batch plants, though 
simple, are typical and representative of many batch plants in used in industry. 
The next section will describe the first example. It will begin with a brief 
description of the plant followed by an explanation of a procedure for achieving 
a particular purpose. The result of the HAZOP from CHECKOP is then 
presented and commented upon. 
Sections 6.2 and 6.3 follow the same format for the other two examples. The 
chapter ends with a summary of the strengths and limitations ofCHECKOP. 
6.1 Tea-Making Example 
6.1.1 Plant Description 
The tea making example consists of the following plant items: kettle, kitchen 
tap, kettle base, power supply socket, tea bag tin, cup, milk bottle and spoon. 
6.1.2 Procedure Description 
Given the plant items, the procedure for input into CHECKOP for making a cup 
of tea has the following steps: 
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I. kettle move_under kitchentap 
2. kettle open_lid 
3. kitchentap turn_on 
4. kettle fill_from kitchentap with water absolute amount I liter 
5. kitchentap turn_off 
6. kettle close lid 
7. kettle move to kettlebase 
8. kettle switch on 
9. kettlebase plug_to supplysocket 
10. kettle switch on 
I I. kettle heat_content until temperature 100 C 
12. kettle switch off 
13. kettlebase plug_offsupplysocket 
14. tea~bag_tin move_to cup 
15. tea_bag_tin open_lid 
16. cup fill_from tea_bag_tin with teabag absolute amount I piece 
17. tea_bag_tin close_lid 
18. kettle move_to cup 
19. cup fill_from kettle with water until level 0.2 liter 
20. cup react_content until elapsed_time 3 second 
21. milkbottle move_to cup 
22. milkbottle open_lid 
23. cup fill_from milkbottle with milk absolute amount 5 milliliter 
24. milkbottle close lid 
25. spoon stir_content of cup until elapsed_time 3 seconds 
26. cup react_content until elapsed_time 5 second 
27. cup remove tea_bag 
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6.1.3 Result Analysis 
Deviation: No Action Consequence 
kettle move_under kitchentap (step I) • Fill action (step 4) cannot be 
completed because there is no 
flow path between kettle and 
kitchentap. 
• Heat action (step 11) may cause 
over heating because there is no 
content in the kettle. 
• Fill action (step 19) cannot be 
completed because there IS no 
content in the kettle. 
• React action (step 20) cannot be 
completed because current 
content is only tea_bag. 
• React action (step 26) cannot be 
completed because the final 
product is not tea. 
Deviation: Early Action Consequence 
kettle close_lid (step 6) executed three. Fill action (step 4) cannot be 
steps early 
• 
• 
• 
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completed because there is no 
flow path between kettle and 
kitchentap. 
Heat action (step 11) may cause 
over heating because there is no 
content in the kettle. 
Fill action (step 19) cannot be 
completed because there is no 
content in the kettle. 
React action (step 20) cannot be 
completed because current 
content is only tea_bag. 
• React action (step 26) cannot be 
completed because the final 
product is not tea. 
kettlebase plUlLOff supplysocket (step • PIUlL off action (step 13) should 
not be done when the electricity 
is still on. 
13) executed one step early 
Deviation: Late Action Consequence 
kettle open_lid (step 2) executed 3. Fill action (step 4) cannot be 
steps late completed because there is no 
flow path between kettle and 
kitchentap. 
• Heat action (step 11) may cause 
over heating because there is no 
content in the kettle. 
• Fill action (step 19) cannot be 
completed because there IS no 
content in the kettle. 
• React action (step 20) cannot be 
completed because current 
content is only tea_bag. 
• React action (step 26) cannot be 
completed because the final 
product is not tea. 
Table 6.1 Sample Output of CHECKOP for Tea Making Example 
It is interesting to observe that some of the deviations generate exactly the same 
consequences. 
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6.2 Batch Reactor Example 1 
6.2.1 Plant Description 
This plant consists of a reactor that takes a solvent and another chemical as 
input. The solvent and the chemical will react together to create a desirable 
product. For the purpose of this example, only the feed from the solvent storage 
tank is included; the feed from the chemical storage tank is left out to keep the 
example simple. The scrubber is for cleaning out any toxic fume before 
releasing it to atmosphere. The plant also includes a line for transferring 
material to the sample point and a line for transferring material to the next 
vessel. 
scrubber 
vaveJojOCrubber 
soIventjee(CvaIve 
storageJank 
reactor 
vessel 
Figure 6.1 Plant Diagram for Batch Reactor Example 1 
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6.2.2 Procedure Description 
The procedure under consideration is the one for charging the reactor with the 
solvent. The charging of the reactor with the solvent may create high pressure 
within the reactor. Therefore, it is important that the valve to the scrubber is 
open so that any excess pressure is vented through the scrubber. Otherwise, the 
build up of pressure may rupture the shell of the reactor. The solvent is a toxic 
material. As mentioned before, the scrubber will clean out any toxic fume 
before releasing it into the atmosphere. 
During charging it is also important that the valves for transferring material to 
the sample point and to the next vessel are closed so that material will not be 
released unintentionally. 
Given the plant and the precautions, the procedure for input into CHECKOP for 
charging the reactor is: 
1. valve_to _scrubber open 
2. valve to next vessel check closed 
- - - -
3. valve_to_sample""point check_closed 
4. solventjeed _valve open 
5. reactor fill from storage_tank with solvent until level reaches 12 tonnes 
6. solvent feed valve close 
- -
7. valve to scrubber close 
6.2.3 Result Analysis 
The scenarios of particular interest are the ones when any of the precautionary 
steps is missed out. This is done by applying the guideword "no" to the 
procedure so that the consequence of not carrying out any of the instructions is 
identified. The result from CHECKOP by applying the guideword "no" to the 
operating procedure is shown in table 6.2. 
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Deviation: No action Consequence 
• Fill operation (step 5) may cause over 
valve to scrubber open (step 1) 
pressure in the reactor 
• Fill operation (step 5) may not be 
valve_to _ next_vessel 
completed because there is a flow-path 
check_closed (step 2) 
out 
• Fill operation (step 5) may not be 
valve_to_sample....point 
completed because there is a flow-path 
check_closed (step 3) 
out 
• Fill operation (step 5) can not be 
solventjeed_valve open (step 4) completed because there is no flow-
path in 
• Fill operation (step 5) may lead to 
solventjeed_ valve close (step 6) overflow because flow-path in is not 
closed 
Table 6.2 Sample Output of CHECKOP for Batch Reactor 1 
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6.3 Batch Reactor Example 2 
6.3.1 Plant Description 
The plant shown in figure 6.2 is a typical batch reactor. It consists of three feed 
lines - one for reactant A, one for reactant B and one for water. There is also a 
feed for cooling water for cooling down the reactor. Different valves are used to 
control these feeds from different tanks. The product can be transferred from the 
reactor to another storage tank or a drain . 
.-
..., 
~ valveio, .".~. I MI 
tanklOl p·101 
,~e~ A 
1 I 
>R 
tanklO2 p·I02 CW out to drain! 
X.r-- -+C><J r 
valvelO3 valve 10 ~ 
p-I03 CWin • R·101 tanklO3 • 
...... ......-
, ,I I " /1 ~ valve IQ.; C><J U tanklOS valvelO 
\ 7 valvelO5 p.l04 p-105 
tankl04 L :> 
to drain2 
• 
Figure 6.2 Plant Diagram for Batch Reactor Example 2 
6.3.2 Procedure Description 
The purpose for this procedure is to generate a product by mixing Reactant A 
and Reactant B. Reactor A is charged from tank 102. Reactant B is charged 
from tank 103. 
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When both materials are being mixed, there will be a reaction between them. 
The reaction will be accelerated by switching on the agitator. While the reaction 
is going on, the heat generated will be taken away by the cooling jacket. After 
the reaction, the final product will be charged into the storage tank. The reactor 
will be washed and ready for the next recipe. The procedure for input into 
CHECKOP is given below: 
1. Valvel02 open 
2. Pump I 02 start 
3. ReactorlOI fill from tankl02 with ReactantA until reactorl01 volume 
50 percent 
4. Pump 1 02 stop 
5. Valve102 close 
6. Agitator turn_on 
7. Valve104 open 
8. Pump104 start 
9. Tank104 flow coolingwater to coolingjacket 
10. Reactor101 cool_content until temperature 25 degree 
11. Valve 1 03 open 
12. Punp103 start 
13. Reactor101 fill from tankl03 with reactantB until volume 60 percent 
14. Pump103 stop 
15. Valve103 close 
16. ReactorlOl react content until 35 minutes 
17. Agitator turn_off 
18. Valvel06 open 
19. Pumpl05 start 
20. Tank 1 05 fill from reactorlOl with productAB until reactor 1 01 empty 
21. Pump 1 05 stop 
22. Valvel06 close 
23. Pump104 stop 
24. Valvel04 close 
25. Valvel07 open 
26. Coolingjacket flow coolingwater to drainl until coolingjacket empty 
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27. Valvel07 close 
28. ValvelOI open 
29. PumplOl start 
30. ReactorlOI wash with washwater 
31. Pump 10 1 stop 
32. ValvelOl close 
33. Valvel05 open 
34. ReactorlOl flow washwater to drain2 until reactor 1 01 empty 
35. Valvel05 close 
6.3.3 Result Analysis 
A variety of scenarios generated by are highlighted below to illustrates the 
capability of CHECKOP. 
Deviation: No action 
valve 1 02 open(step 1) 
pump 1 04 start(step 8) 
Consequence 
• Switching pump102 on (step 2) while 
valve 1 02 IS closed will result m 
pump 1 02 being damaged. 
• Reactor101 cannot be filled from 
tank102 (step 3) because there is no 
flow path between tank102 and 
reactor 101. 
• Reactor101 cannot be cooled (step 10) 
as it has no content. 
• ProductAB cannot be emptied from 
reactor101 (step 20) because 
reactor101 's content is not productAB 
• Consequence 1 : Step (9) cooling water 
can't flow_through cooling jacket from 
tank 1 04 because there is no flow path 
between coolingjacket and tank104 
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agitator turn _ one step 6) 
Deviation: Early Action 
reactorlOI filljrom tank I 02 
with ReactantA until volume 50 
percent(step 3) 
valve I 02 close( step 5) 
• Consequence2: Step (13) Since 
cooling water is not running through 
cooling jacket while there is a reaction 
between ReactantA and ReactantB, the 
reaction will lead to overheating in 
reactor I 01 
• Consequence: Since the agitator is not 
running while there is a reaction in 
step (13) between ReactantA and 
ReactantB, it will lead to overheating 
in reactor 10 I 
• Consequence: Overheating in step (16) 
because the content of the reactor is 
just ReactantB 
Consequence 
• Step (3) cannot be completed because 
pump 102 is off. 
• ReactorlOI content cannot be cooled 
(step 10) as there is no content. 
• ProductAB cannot be emptied from 
reactorl0l (step 20) because 
reactprl01's content is not productAB 
• ReactorlOI cannot be filled from 
tankl02 (step 3) because there is no 
flow path between tankl02 and 
reactor I 0 I. 
• ReactorlOI content cannot be cooled 
(step 10) as there is no content. 
• ProductAB cannot be emptied from 
reactor 1 01 (step 20) because 
reactor I 0 I 's content is not productAB 
Figure 6.3 Sample Output of CHECKOP for Batch Reactor 2 
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6.4 Summary and Discussion 
The examples considered are typical in that: 
1) Flow path due to physical connection between units is addressed in the 
system design because it is common in batch process. In the tea example, 
the connection is built up by physically moving a unit to another. In other 
examples, this connection is built up by the preconfigured plant layout as 
described in the plant description where a unit can have one or more than 
one incoming and/or outgoing flow path. Thus, the usage of this feature 
could be extensible in other batch plants. 
2) Action Model Library is an extensible template for batch processes. It 
provides a generic but efficient means to deal with actions in different types 
of batch plants. For example, the action 'filljrom' template is used in all 
the batch examples to accomplish different intentions. More action words 
could be attended when more cases are studied. 
3) Simulation engine proved to be efficient in representing the causal 
relationships between the state variables. It can identify the deviations due to 
change of state variables, which might be caused by equipment malfunction 
or human error, and propagate such deviations through the plant or 
subsequent actions. 
CHECKOP has successfully identified hazards associated with operation 
problems. It can systematically explore the effects caused by operator human 
errors and automate the process of Hazop. The important keywords 'No', 
. 'Early', and 'Late' are addressed in the CHECKOP system. They correspond to 
common human errors such as missing an operation, or executing an action 
earlier or later than expected in a sequence of actions. However, it is sti11limited 
in the following ways: 
1) The Parser for inputting plant description file is still at the coding level and 
is very primitive. The plan to load plant description files from external 
sources and integrate the parser into the system. 
2) At the moment, only three keywords are considered. The Deviation 
Generator need to be extended to address more guidewords. 
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3) The current reaction module is very simple and contains very little 
infonnation. A more comprehensive module should be developed to deal 
with this important feature. 
4) The Action Model needs to be extended to deal with more actions related to 
different types of equipment. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Futu re Work 
7.1 Conclusions 
In this chapter, there are mainly two parts of work the conclusions can be drawn 
from, i.e., literature review and proposed framework. The former built up the 
background about what previous work has been done, where the current 
research is, and what tools we could use to build up an adequate model to 
describe batch processing plants. The latter suggests a possible solution to the 
current problems and is expected to overcome the shortcomings of other 
researches in this field. 
In view of the tools investigated, Petri nets help provide a way of modeling and 
understanding discrete systems. Petri nets can be used as a modeling tool to 
model actions and operations. However, Petri nets have problems in terms of 
handling complexity when modeling real systems. Furthermore, it cannot model 
the causal relationship required to do Hazop. These shortcomings limit the use 
of Petri nets to automated batch Hazop. Frame based system, however, is well 
able to carry information for reasoning. It can describe actions and support 
inheritance and reuse. It is also expressive and concise since each frame carries 
only necessary information for reasoning purpose. AI planning, on the other 
hand, is a tool to coordinate the sequence to reach a goal state from an initial 
state. In batch processing system, sequences of the actions and operations are 
very important since they suggest the system behavior or states in the implied 
temporal order. With AI planning, we can figure out a reasonable sequence for a 
'"'-
procedure. Finally, in the literature review of the qualitative reasoning part, the 
concept of quantity space and landmark may be used to define the scale of the 
state values. Also, since QR tend to suffer from the problem of ambiguity, some 
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semi-quantitative simulator may be used as a filter to reduce this problem in 
future work. 
The proposed framework provides a system architecture, a way of representing 
knowledge and a reasoning strategy for the automation of hazard identification 
of batch chemical plants. Although the chosen approach is a simple 
representation, it is sufficient to allow a wide range of phenomena to be 
modeled. Three simple examples are used to point out where we are trying to 
make improvement. Some suggestions have been made to address how to tackle 
the problems and develop an efficient modeling language for the chemical 
process plant. The test result shows its execution is efficient and expressive, 
nevertheless, the proposed framework has only been applied to these small 
examples. The next phrase of research is to apply the created modeling language 
to different cases to test further its expressiveness and powerfulness. 
In terms of the original objectives as described in the chapter I section 1.2, all 
of them are addressed. The knowledge required by the hazaop analysis are 
integrated within a novel framework with extensibility, reusability, and 
expressiveness. A prototype was developed and tested using three case studies. 
Compared with the outcome of previous work, the outcomes from this approach 
show that the proposed framework can be used to simulate the qualitative 
behaviour of batch process plants and can bring forward the opportunities of 
applying this approach for tackling processes with discrete behaviours. 
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7.2 Future Work 
The work described in this thesis has demonstrated the feasibility of using the 
state-based simulation approach to automate batch Hazop. Future work should 
focus on improving the design and implementation of the prototype then testing 
it using more and larger batch chemical processing plants. Some areas that 
require attention are: 
1) In the structural representation, a definition of how equipment items are 
further decomposed should be described. It is suggested that the 
principle of such decomposition should be based on the device ontology 
by de Kleer and Brown. It interprets physical systems as networks of 
devices whose interactions are through a fixed set of units. 
2) Chapter 3 only discussed the effect of the actions on the system 
behaviour. It did not discuss what happens if there is a deviation of 
process variables, for example, the temperature of the water in a tank is 
becoming too hot. In the equipment item modelling, a slot can be added 
to represent the default value so that any deviation can be detected. It is 
suggested that a slot such as content-temperature (default cold) could be 
added. Once such a slot is added then any deviation from the default 
value can be detected and the cause identified. 
3) Currently, the values that a state variable can take on are not clearly 
defined. This may cause ambiguity and the system behaviour becomes 
inaccurate. To tackle this problem, Forbus' quantity space may be 
adopted to support qualitative reasoning. Kuipers' idea about landmark 
values are useful to identify where the qualitative value of the variable 
changes. A finite set of labels such as very hot, hot, nonnal, cold, very 
cold can be used to signify and compare the variable changes. Besides, 
quantitative numerical information can be integrated with qualitative 
simulation, for example, Kuipers' semi-quantitative simulators as filters, 
to resolve such ambiguities in system behaviour. 
4) Some templates for actions have been defined. The set of templates may 
be extended when actions from more case studies are considered. This is 
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necessary to allow a wide range of instructions to be expressed naturally 
and unambiguously. 
5) The current reaction model is very limited and contains very little 
information. A more extensive reaction model will need to be developed 
to deal with a wide range of chemicals. 
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Appendix A 
Batch Reactor Example 1 - CHECKOP 
Output 
.. -' 
Operation Instruction: 
Step (1) valye to scrubber open 
Step (2) ¥\II¥\I to next ¥\Issei checkclas.il!i 
Step (3) valye to sample pajnt checkdosed 
Step (4) solvent fe!:ll.J(1I!:i1t open 
Step (5) reactor fiJLfi:llm storage taok with solvent until level 12 ~ 
Step (6) solvent feed vaIY-!t close 
Step (7) valye to Scrubber close 
Report for t!= Resu~: 
Deviation: NO Action u Step (1) yalve to Scrubber open 
Consequence: (5~ overpressure in the reactor because y:~!~~ tQ squbber is off 
Deviation: NO Action - Step (2) ~..Jlext ¥\Issei checkclosgg 
Consequence: (5) can't be completed because valye to next yessel is on 
Deviation: NO Action - Step (3) ¥\live to samplg DDiot checkclDse~ 
Consequence: (5) can't be completed because yalye to sample poim is on 
Deviation: NO Action - Step (4) sol¥llot f!te.~~ open 
Consequence: (5WJ;!QI can1 be filled from ,torace tank because there is no now path between 
SQmge..Jrulli and reactor 
Deviation: NO Action - Step (5) reactor fiJL.J!Qm storag~ tallk with solvent until level 12 I=:i 
Deviation: NO Action - Step (6)~e~close 
Consequence: .s.tem.5) is not able to be completed as solyent feed valye aperture is stin on 
There could have been more flow than expected. 
Deviation: NO Action - Step (7) ¥\II¥II to squbber close 
I 
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Appendix B 
Batch Reactor Example 2 - CHECKOP 
Output 
Report Co< Hoz2ll R""II: 
De\iation: NO Action •• Step (1) \'alvel01 open 
Consequence; (2)"alvtl02 could be damaged as "an-eIOl is stJll offwbilst pumpl02's stale is on 
Consequence: (3keactO{l 0 1 can't be filled from. tankl02 because there- is no flow path ber.,\'een tank! 02 and reactorl 0 1 
Consequence: (6l1:bm is nothing in reartarIO} at the moment. there could be a risk ofmecbanical damage. 
Consequl!!lce: (lOmctO(J01 can't be cooled as there is no content 
Consequence (16) No reaction elm occur because the content of the reactor is ~~ 
De\iation: NO Action -- Step (1) pumpl02 start 
Consequence: (3~task can't be completed because pumpl02 is off 
Consequence: (6lD!m is nothing in reactor! 01 at the mom~ there could be a risk of mechanical damage. 
Consequence: (lOkeactorl01 can't be cooled as there is no content 
Consequence (16) No reaction can occur because the content oftbe reactor is just ReactantS 
Deviation: NO Action -- Step (3) reactor! 01 fill from tankl02 with geactantA until volume 50 percent 
Consequence: (6lThere is nothing in reactodOl lit the moment, there could be a risk of mechanical damage. 
Consequence: (l Oyactor! 0 1 can't be cooled as there is no content. 
Consequence (16) No reaction cnn occur because the content of the reactor is just ReactantS 
D.,iation: NO Action -- Stq> (4) pumplO~ stop 
Consequence: (5'b:!W~lQ~ could be damaged as puropl01 is mn on whilst 'oU\'el02's aperture is ofi' 
D.,iation; NO Action -- Stq> (5) "ah-.l 02 clos. 
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l>e\iarioo: NO Adiop -- Step (6) q:itw:.r mm....sm 
ComequeDC"e: (13l!iiIl!!s!is nol mnnina: ","bile therr is a rractioa bmtecn ~ and ~ IradiDg 10 O'o~ in rrldorlOl 
Deviation: NO A~ -- Step (i) \-M-c 1 04 Clpcn 
Consc~: (Sl!JhUQ:i codd be d.amqcd as,'ah"dO~ is JtiII otI\dlist~lO-l"1 state is OD 
ConsequcDCC: (9lsoo!ipiiacl;S; CIm'I ~ t=kl04 "ith ~ because 1hcrc is 110 flow pa!h betwecn ~ md tanklO-J 
Consecp:rx:e: (131.~ iJ DOt ruar:Iina ,,-bile there is a relICtion bem"een &1~ and ~ Ieadina: to O'o"e:hcmic; in reactor 1 01 
De'\WioD: NO Action -- Stql (S) pumplO~ SW!: 
Consequence; (9lsoolingjacket ctIIl't ~ tmlkl04 '\\OiJ:b. cpom'!UtT because there is no flow path bU\''tm sooingjiltk£! mu:!. tmJkl04 
Corueqncnc:c: (13lcooJingjackt:t is not nmaina: while Iherc is a reaction ~ec:n ~ and ~ ltadinJ to m-erhealici il reactorlOl 
De'\iation:::-;O Action -- Step (9) cooJingiacl;et ~ tllllkl1)4 wUh cootinmm 
Dmse~ (13)cpogacker: is !lOt nmaina: ,,-bile there iI; a reaction btm'ec:n ~ and ~ kacq to o'l.memq in reactorlOl 
Imiation: XO Action -- Step (11) 'w-e103 open 
Coruequencc: (1~ could be damaged 1lI,"~"CI03 is still otfwhilstpumpl03's statr is on 
Consequence: (l3~Ql can't be fiDedfrom tmkl03 bcawc Ihcre is DO flowpAlh between tmlklOJ andreactorlOl 
Consequence (16) No fC1ICIio:o aID. occur becmJse the coatett of the reactor is just ~ 
De'\istioo:NO Action -- Step (11) pumpl03 SW!: 
Consequcnc:e: (13~tDsk ='t be c~d beantsepumpl03 El off 
Consequence (16) No reaction CIll1 occur b~ausc Ibe CO!ilel1 of the reactoc" is just ~ 
DC\ia:ioa: NO Action -- Stql (13)rc:actorlOll!1lA9'mt=klOj \\iIb~UIItiI \"Q!umc 60 percem 
Consequence (16) No ruc:tion = occur becDllle the comem oflhe reactor is just ~ 
~iarioa::NO Action -- Step (14) pumplOJ stop 
Comequeuce: (15~ cocld be da:maged as pumpl03 iI; still on whilst'l.w'tl03's aperture' is off 
DC\Wion:: NO Action -- Step (l~) 'w-elOJ close' 
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Da'imion: EarI)' Acrioa -- Stq) {2} pumplO:! start (-I) 
Consequence: (l~ could be damaged u,lW.-elO:! is stiD oIIwbilstpu:lllplO2's state is on 
Deo.iario:D: Ead).' AaiaD _. Step (3) reacttJr101 tiI..k9m tzDklOl v .. itb &!mmA mttiI volume !O perccnr: (-I) 
Conseqt1OlCe: (3l!!!s.task CllIl't be completed becll11Se pumplO:! is c4I 
C ODSeqo;ence: 0lDm:£ is DO'Ibini iD rndorl 01 at the moment. Iba-e codd be & risk of mcdUlcical damq:e.. 
Consequence: (lO~ can't be cooled as. then is DO cODt:eal. 
CODSequence (16) ~o reec1ion cm occur because w eooleIlt oftbe reactor is Nn &1Ict!!!!tB 
Im~ Early Action _. Step (4) pumplOl stop (·1) 
Conseqnence: (3~ task can't be completed because ptmIplOl is c4I 
Consequence: (61illg:£ is DOdiq iD reactorlOllll the momem, tbcr"e could be a risk olmccMniCZII. da:Dq:e. 
CODSCqucDCe: (1 OlI.£m!ltl2l ~'t be- cooled lIS tbm' is DO conkut. 
Consequence (16»):0 reaction can occur because !be CCICIlcDt of the reactot is ~ 
De'l-iatiou: Early Actica -- Step (~\'~hl02 close (.1) 
CODSe~c: (!~ could be dmn:icd I.lI pumpl02 is nil on "iiht\,lIveI02'11Ipc:rture is olf 
D~imion:: ElIrly Action·- Strop (6) qitator 9lJl.J!B (-I) 
Deo.iaIion: Early Action _. Step (i) \~'t'104 open (-1) 
DC'\Ution: Eariy Action _. Step (S) pumpli)..l start (·1) 
DC\iation: Early Action _. Step (9) C;;oomacket ~ tankl 04 "iIh c;;oolioo ... atg (-1) 
Dt\iarioD: E=1).' Action _. Step (10) reactor) 01 cool cotllrnt1Wi1 tel!Jperamte 2~ degree (-I) 
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IfflWion: Early A.ctiou •• Slep (5) ,-ah·e\O:! dose (-:::) 
Consequence: (~toUld tit clamaJed as pumplO:! is stiD. OD \\i!z1sr:,-ah'elO:::'1 tlperture is elf 
Consequence: (3~ can't be IiDed from taaldOl becmse Ihcu is DO Bow paIh betwee:a ImIklOl tmd reactodOl 
COI1ICqucnce: (6Ul!m: is DOlbiai in reactorlOI at dJt, ~!here cOtlld be a risk of medumical c1mnaic. 
C=sequence: (10~ CIID't tit cooled as there is DO cO%lleDL 
COQiequence (16) No reaction can occurbcclIllSe 1be contC%lt oftbe relICtCl' is iuS &acumtB 
ImiaDon:Earty ActiIXI-· Step (6) ~~(.1) 
Coweqoaa«:: ~tz!3) There con1d be liquid. rp&ge as the 6I!icJ process is goiIl;: OIl 
Iffl'imion: Early Action -- Step (8) pumplM stan (-2) 
C.ousequeocc: (~toUldbe dmDa;ed as \'llh'tl~ is stiD05v.'bistptlllplv.l'lltiI:tc is OIl 
~iatiOD: Early Acion -- Step (10) JUlclorl 0 1 SW content until tcmpnature :::3 dc&rec (.2) 
ImWioD: Emi}' Acice .. Step (12) pumplO) stan (.~ 
CoweqtlCDCI!: (ll~ could be dmJq:ed as ,'Bh-elO) is still otr~:hilstpumpl03'1 5tGte is OIl 
OC\iatiOD: Emt, AC1ioo •• Step (13) tc~torlOl tiIU:smI. tlInkl0) \\iIb ~UDtiI ,'OIUme 60 pctecnl (.2) 
CoweqllClCl!: (13}r.t.a.st.srlQl CIID't be filed &om ImIkl03 betmue!here is no &\\' pacb bet'Mcea tllJlkIO) IIDd teactorlOl 
C=sequmu (16) 1'0 reaction can occur bccmue the contcnl: oftbt reactor is just ~
oC\iation: Eady Artioo .. Step (14) pumpl03 stop (-::!) 
Consequeqcc: (1~:F....!'lQ.J codd be dam.aied as puraplO) is JtiI OD \\1i1st ",hIO)'s apcrtJJre is off 
Consequence: (14}:lh:tiQJ. could be damq:ed as pumplO) is sliD. 00 wblst '-M-elO)'s apI!Itl:O"c is off 
Consequence: (13Ulg[lQl (lID't be liIIed &om tacklO) beeauJe that is ne flow path between Wlkl03 and rtaclorlOl 
Comequeac:c (16) Xo r~ cm OCc:tl" bcclIllSc the coalem of !he rcactQr is just ~
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